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GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 28

SUMMER 1994

NUMBER 4

ARTICLES

AN ASSESSMENT OF PAST EXTRAMURAL
REFORMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF
APPEALS *
Thomas E. Baker**
1. INTRODUCTION

My nomenclature needs explanation by way ofintroduction. This
Article will evaluate reforms designated here "extramural" or
"structural." Although the distinction between "intramural" and
"extramural" reforms may seem a bit metaphysical, the line can be

*Adapted with permission from THoMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL-THE
PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS, Chapter 8, Copyright 1994 by West Publishing
Company, 610 Opperman Drive, P.O. Box 64526, St. Paul, MN 55164-0526; 800-328-9352.
This book began as a report ofthe Justice Research Institute for the Federal Judicial Center.
This Chapter was adapted, in part, with permission from Thomas E. Baker, A Compendium
ofProposals to Reform the United States Courts ofAppeals, 37 U. F'LA. L. REV. 225 (1985).
The views and positions expressed here are those of the author alone.
** Alvin R. Allison Professor, Texas Tech University School ofLaw. B.S. cum laude 1974,
Florida State University; J.D. with high honors 1977, University of Florida.
The author is grateful for the suggestions and comments of: Honorable Levin H. Campbell;
Honorable John C. Godbold; Professor Arthur D. Hellman; Honorable James C. Hill;
Professor A. Leo Levin; Honorable Richard A. Posner; William K Slate, IT, Esquire;
Honorable J. Clifford Wallace; and Honorable Joseph F. Weis, Jr. Thanks are owed to Diana
Nichols and Michael S. Truesdale for their able research assistance.
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defended in terms of the separation of powers.
An intramural reform is a change in the way the courts of
appeals hear and decide an appeal. These changes amount to
procedural shortcuts, resulting in an abbreviated appellate process,
justified for the most part by the press of a growing docket. 1 New
internal operating procedures, screening and inventorying, the
nonargument calendar, dispositions without opinion, larger
numbers of staff attorneys and law clerks, and other related courtinitiated reforms have allowed the courts of appeals to cope with
the large increases in the numbers of appeals over the last
generation. I believe that intramural reforms have all but played
out and that the proposals for additional procedural reforms being
considered do not represent sufficient additional efficiencies to
allow the courts of appeals to continue to cope with projected
increases in the numbers of appeals.
The subject of this Article is extramural reforms. These require
congressional action. Unlike intramural reforms, which are
changes in the way the courts of appeals perform their traditional
role, extramural reforms purposively and directly change the role
of the intermediate court in the federal system. This Article will
discuss the historical methods Congress has used to come to the aid
of the federal courts under threat of caseload. Separate sections
will consider: Reducing Original Jurisdiction; Alternative Dispute
Resolution; Creating Circuit Juageships; Dividing Courts of
Appeals; Creating Specialized SubJect Matter Courts; and Improving the Quality of Federal Legislation. The worry expressed here
is that these familiar reforms may no longer be feasible, for various
reasons which will be discussed, or may not be sufficient to deal
with the worsening problems of the U.S. Courts of Appeals.

1 See generally Thomas E. Baker, A Compendium ofProposals to Reform the United States
Courts of Appeals, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 225, 243-73 (1985) (discussing role and function of
federal judiciary's intermediate tier) [hereinafter Baker, A Compendium of Proposals];
Thomas E. Baker, Intramural Reforms: How the U.S. Courts of Appeals Have Helped
Themselves, 26 ST. MARy'S L.J.1321 (1994); Thomas E. Baker, Proposed Intramural Reforms:
What the U.S. Courts ofAppeal Might Do to Help Themselves, 22 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1994).
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II. REDUCING ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
It may seem strange to begin a discussion of structural reforms

of the courts of appeals with a section on reducing the original
jurisdiction of the district courts. The most far-reaching proposals
for dealing with the courts of appeals' dockets, however, do not
directly concern appellate jurisdiction. Substantial reduction in the
scope of the original jurisdiction in the district courts would have
a dramatic, albeit derivative, impact on the error correction and
lawmaking functions of the courts of appeals. Therefore, such
proposals are properly considered here, at least as a preliminary
matter.2
Calls for a rational and coherent approach toward ordering the
jurisdiction of the federal courts-a clear statement of their
purposes and goals-have been heard ever since we have had
federal courts. 3 Recently, Professor Rosenberg has provided an apt
functional description:
The federal courts' central purposes and functions
are to protect the individual liberties, freedoms and
rights of these people; to give definitive interpretation and application to constitutional provisions and
federal laws, and to assure the continued vitality of
democratic processes of government. These are vital
functions for the welfare of the nation and its people.
No other agency or institution of government can
perform these duties as effectively as the federal

2

In some respects, the essential problem of caseload for a court system
must derive from the trial level, since that is where the cases that enter
a judicial system first appear. In that sense the appellate courts' cases
are only a partial outline ofwhat the court system must treat. Certainly
dealing with the trial court level is one crucial part of examining such
caseload considerations.
WILLIAM P. McLAUCHLAN, FEDERAL COURT CASELOADS 109 (1984).
3 See THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton). This argument is adapted, with
permission, from: Thomas E. Baker, Some Preliminary Thoughts on Long-Range Planning
for the Federal Judiciary, 23 TEx. TECH L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1992) (discussing mission offederal
courts and role of Long-Range Planning Committee of the Judicial Conference).
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courts."
Essentially, the federal courts are'how the Constitution seeks to
"establish justice," in the Preamble's words. 6 There is, however, a
Constitutional rub. To have a valid claim on being just, the
definition of "mission" must be free from baser political motives6
and ideology.7 Yet, the demarcation of federal court jurisdiction is
given over to the plenary power of one of the political branches,
Congress. For the most part, and from the beginning, defining the
role of the federal courts has been an exercise in federalism. Only
general lessons can be learned from the teachings of history,
tradition, legislative and judicial precedents, and constitutional
law. 8
Two decades ago, then-Second Circuit Chief Judge Friendly
penned a remarkable book that remains this generation's seminal
work on reducing and rationalizing the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. 9 All his recommendations cannot fairly be summarized in
4 Maurice Rosenberg, The Federal Courts in the 21st Century, 15 NOVA L. REV. 105, 111
(1991) (quoting DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMM. ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM,
THE NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 1 (1977)).
5 U.S. CONST. pmbl. See generally Abram Chayes, How Does the Constitution Establish
Justice, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1026, 1026 (1988) (arguing that the Constitution establishes
justice by instituting the federal judiciary as the "custodian ofjustice").
6 But see Mark Tushnet, General Principles of the Revision of Federal Jurisdiction: A
Political Analysis, 22 CONN. L. REV. 621 (1990) (analyzing questions of federal jurisdiction
in ~rms of political, not public policy, ratifications).
7 See generally George D. Brown, Nonideological Judicial Reform and Its Limits-The
Report ofthe Federal Courts Study Committee, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973 (1990) (arguing
that the Federal Courts Study Committee should have dealt with the fundamental
ideological issues conrerning the proper role of federal courts in our nation); Richard H.
Fallon, The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141 (1988) (describing two
competing models of judicial federalism and their influences on federal courts issues, and
advocating the acceptance of a middle ground in resolving those issues).
8 See Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role ofthe Federal Courts, 1990
B.Y.U. L. REV. 67, 75-76 (discussing various proposals for decreasing federal court caseload
by focusing on function offederaljudiciary).; James C. Hill & Thomas E. Baker, Dam Federal
JUrisdictionl, 32 EMORY L.J. 3, 80-81 (1983) (evaluating federal jurisdiction decisions of
United States Supreme Court during 1981 term in terms of their impact on federal courts'
workload).
9 HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973) (recounting the
late Chief Judge Friendly's celebrated Carpentier Lectures at Columbia Law School). See
also MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF POWER
(2d ed. 1990) (examining allocation ofjurisdictional and lawmaking authority among various
components within federal system and tension between components); AMERICAN LAw
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so small a space as this. Chief Judge Friendly's themes, however,
bear directly on the thesis here and merit repeating. Disciples of
his philosophy call on Congress to redefme federal courtjurisdiction
so that the courts can better perform their constitutional mandate. 10 This task is uniquely political. Indeed, federal jurisdiction
ultimately is politics. Congress must first preserve the constitutional value of redress for those claims and claimants that present
the raison d'etre for the courts of Article III. Second, public policy
obliges Congress to ration remaining resources for cases that serve
important non-constitutional national interests.
Chief Judge Friendly taught us these general lessons. He
described the outer limits of the debate over the role of federal
courts by contrasting a minimum model and a maximum model. l l
The minimum model posits that:
the best course is to put trust in the state courts,
subject to appropriate federal appellate review, save
for those heads ofjurisdiction, by no means insignificant in case-generating power, where everything is to
be gained and nothing is to be lost by granting
original jurisdiction to inferior federal courtS. 12

INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DMSION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
(Official Draft 1969).
10 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS-CRISIS AND REFORM 169-97 (1985)
(discussing the role of federal courts in a federal system); see also Harry T. Edwards, The
Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy- of the Federal Courts: A Causation-Based
Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IOWA L. REv. 871, 922 (1983) (critically
assessing merits of reform proposals aimed at reducing federal court workload); Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior, and Workload ofFederal Judges,
55 U. COLO. L. REV. I, 15-16 (1983) (discussing good judicial behavior, how it is impeded by
heavy and complex caseloads, and measures to assistjudges in carrying out their jobs); Alvin
B. Rubin, Bureaucratization of the Federal Courts: The Tension Between Justice and
Efficiency, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 648, 657 (1980) (discussing changes in character of
federal cases and effects on nature of federal judges' workload). See generally Chemerinsky
& Kramer, supra note 8; Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court
Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984)
(discussing recent legislation curbing federal courtjurisdiction); Judith Resnik, Housekeeping:
The Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal Trial Courts, 24 GA. L. REV. 909 (1990)
(examining allocation and value of work assignments in federal trial courts).
11 FRIENDLY, supra note 9, at 11.
12 Id. at 8 (citation omitted).
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At the other extreme, the. maximum model "would go to the full
sweep of constitutional power" under Article III because "the
federal courts provide a 'juster justice' than the state courts, [and]
the more cases there [are] in federal courts, the better."13
Of course, no one is likely to take either of these extreme views
of federal jurisdiction once and for all. Over the 200-plus year
history of the federal courts, Congress has gone back and forth
between these models, never fully or completely embracing one or
the other, and often enacting jurisdictional legislation containing
different provisions that endorse both models simultaneously. This
legislative ambivalence cannot be denied.
Descending to a lower level of abstraction discloses at least three
problematic implications from these lofty sentiments. First, during
the recent "crisis" decades, the number of appeals has risen
significantly higher than the number of cases filed in the district
COurtS. 14 Therefore, only a relatively large cutback on original
jurisdiction-either across the board or selectively by categories
that generate high numbers of appeals-will achieve significant
appellate reductions. Second, consensus is lacking on which areas
to target for change. The elimination of diversity jurisdiction, an
obvious yet controverted solution, would relieve approximately onefourth of the district courts' dockets and one-tenth of the courts of
appeals' dockets. 15 Considering the history of this jurisdiction,
however, no one should expect it to be abolished in an existing
lifetime plus twenty-one years. Third, congressional momentum is
flowing in the opposite direction. Today, access to federal courts is

Id. at 12 (citation omitted).
See Charles R. Haworth, Screening and Summary Procedures in the United States
Court of Appeals, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 257, 261; POSNER, supra note 10, at 82.
115 See generally Victor Eugene Flango & Craig Boersema, Changes in Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction: Effects on State Court CaseloodB, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 405 (1990) (reviewing
arguments over diversity jurisdiction, examining proposals to change diversity jurisdiction
and comparing diversity cases with state court cases); Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge
Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671 (1992)
(advocating elimination of diversity jurisdiction not because of increased caseload but
because of unavoidable intrusion of federal courts into state court functions); Diversity of
Citizenship Jurisdiction, 1982: Hearing on H.R. 6691 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 95-96 (1982).
18
14
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easier than ever before. 16 Congress has encroached on traditional
state law domains during this same period with neither rhyme nor
reason. And there is no sign that Congress is going to change its
attitude toward continually overcommitting the scarce resources of
the federal COurtS. 17
A wholesale reassessment of the subject matter allocation of
cases between federal and state courts most assuredly is beyond the
scope of this Article. In arecent paper, Professor Martin H. Redish
made a thoughtful attempt to identify and apply the factors that
should go into an informed analysis of original jurisdiction: (1)
facilitating state-federal court cross-pollination; (2) maintaining the
autonomy ofthe two judicial sovereigns; (3) preserving some degree
of litigant choice; (4) achieving litigation efficiency; (5) assuring
fundamental fairness; (6) restraining the judicial branch within the
judicial role; and (7) expecting an overall coherence and logical
consistency of jurisdictional principles. 18 This factorial approach
is as good as any, and bett~r than most, but it is endorsed here for
what it leaves out: The missing factor is docket control. 19 Professor Redish's omission was intentional and nicely illustrates the
point being made here. The concern for workload, the interest in
reducing the dockets of federal courts, is not an appropriate

II See, e.g., The Child Support Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992); The Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); The
Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1901-2013 (1988). Congress
increased appellate access substantially with the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3351, 3553 (1991). See generally Victor Williams, Solutions to Federal
Judicial Gridlock, 76 JUDICATURE 185 (1993) (advocating creation of more judgeships and
prompt replacement of vacancies to combat present backlog of federal cases).
17 The practice of "deficit jurisdiction" likewise does harm to principles of federalism. In
his 1991 year-end report on the federal judiciary, ChiefJustice Rehnquist expressed concern
and alarm over the docket prospects of two bills pending in Congress. The first would
provide for a federal criminal prosecution in virtually any case in which a firearm was used
in a homicide, and the second would create criminal and civil federal courtjurisdiction in the
broad area of domestic-relations/spousal abuse. The Chief on the Judiciary: Less Is More,
LEGAL TIMEs, Jan. 6, 1992, at 6. See generally Victor Williams, Help Wanted-Federal
Judges: Judicial Gridlock; Solving an Immediate Problem and Averting a Future Crisis, 24
LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (1992).
II Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation ofJudicial Business Between State and
Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and "The Martian Chronicles,· 78 VA. L. REV. 1769,
1772-85 (1992).
11 Id. at 1785-87.
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consideration for fashioning the rules of federal court jurisdiction. 20 This is not to imply a lack of sympathy for federal judges
facing impossible workloads or for litigants facing costly delays.
Rather, Professor Redish deems it entirely appropriate for Congress
to consider docket implications when fashioning substantive rights,
or more to the point, to refrain from fashioning new substantive
federal rights for that very reason. 21 This is the most appropriate
priority to give docket or workload considerations.
The congressionally created Federal Courts Study Committee
explicitly endorsed this methodology:
Any human institution is improvable, and the federal
courts are no exception. Many of our recommendations are in the spirit of this observation, and their
merits are independent of the current crisis of the
federal court system. In places we have recommended an expansion in the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. We want a better federal court system, not
a smaller one. Our proposals would not make the
system smaller, even if all of them were adopted;
they would merely prevent the system from being
overwhelmed by a rapidly growing and already
enormous caseload; and in doing so they would
preserve access to the system for those who most
need it. 22
In the present discussion, it is at once important and sufficient to
explicitly endorse this methodology for future assessments of the
original jurisdiction of the federal courts.

III.

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Related to the reallocation of disputes between the state and
federal courts, the theme of reallocating disputes out of the court

See Hill & Baker, supra note 8, at 76-87.
Redish, supra note 18, at 1786.
22 REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMI'ITEE 3-4 (Apr. 2, 1990) [hereinafter
STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT].
20

21

HeinOnline -- 28 Ga. L. Rev. 870 1993-1994

1994]

EXTRAMURAL REFORMS

871

system altogether through Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
has garnered much recent attention. The idea is to provide out-ofcourt resolution of otherwise federal controversies by negotiation,
mediation, conciliation, and settlements. 23 As was suggested in
the above discussion about reducing original jurisdiction, the
impact from this approach also would be felt most directly at the
trial level and only derivatively at the middle tier. Considered
from the particular perspective of the appellate court, however,
more widespread reliance on ADR would resolve more disputes
without the possibility of any appeal in those cases. Thus, each
dispute resolved through some ADR technique represents one less
potential appeal. Because at present these methods are not used
as much as litigation is used to resolve disputes, they hold out a
promise for significant caseload relief that many people find
attractive. Circuit Judge Edwards, himself a recent convert, has
suggested that if the caseload and inadequate coping mechanisms
threaten the federal appellate ideal, an emphasis on ADR would
preserve substantial rights and further enhance the quality of the
remaining judicial determinations. 24
The purpose here is not to discuss the entire range of available
ADR techniques, but a few may be identified to illustrate their

23 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage ofAdjudicative
Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1808
(1986) (proposing two-tier trial procedure and criticizing civil jury procedure); Irving R.
Kaufman, Reform for a System in Crisis: Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal
Courts, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1990) (encouragingjudicial experimentation with ADR). See
generally Robert H. Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, Address at the
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice (Apr. 7-9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 231 (discussing alternative out-of-court dispute
resolution mechanisms); E. .ALLAN LIND & JOHN E. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURTANNExED ARBITRATION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1981) (evaluating experimental
local rules requiring mandatory nonbinding arbitration in some civil actions in three federal
district courts); Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J.
1 (1982) (proposing use of regulatory negotiation and explaining conditions needed for its
success); Paul Nejelski & Andrew S. Zeldin, Court-Anne:cedArbitration in the Federal Courts:
The Philadelphia Story, 42 MD. L. REV. 787 (1983) (advancing court-amended arbitration as
most effective means ofremedying current judicial problems); Maurice Rosenberg, Devising
Procedures that Are Civil to Promote Justice that Is Civilized, 69 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1971)
(proposing reforms ofjudicial system to prevent overuse and abuse).
S4 Edwards, supra note 10, at 929.
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substantially unrealized potentia1.25 Several federal district courts
experimented with court-annexed arbitration during the mid-1980s,
and Congress expanded the program.26 These forms of arbitration
varied from voluntary to mandatory, and from case-by-case
approaches to the diversion of whole categories of cases.27 Nearly
thirty districts established either voluntary or mandatory forms of
court-annexed mediation under the district's local rules. 28 And the
programs in some districts are very elaborate. 29 In some districts,
the ADR technique of choice is the summary jury trial. 30 In other
districts, the mini-trial is relied on.31 While these and other ADR
techniques have been fervently "hyped" by some participants, other
commentators on the scene have sounded notes of caution and
concern. 32 ADR is a relatively recent phenomenon, and these
techniques must be evaluated objectively and empirically.33 The
chief caution is more philosophical than procedural, although it is
expressed as a concern for the lost procedure:
[W]e should be concerned that some ADR procedures
abandon most of the formalities we associate with
protections against arbitrariness, that the long-term

26 See generally A. Leo Levin & Deirdre Golash, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Federal
District Courts, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 29 (1985) (advancing benefits of alternative mechanism
of dispute resolution); Lauren K Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to
Caseload, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 3, 24-28 (describing forms of federal court ADR). But see Kim
Dayton, The Myth ofAlternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76 IOWA L. REv.

889 (1991) (arguing ADR has not reduced backlogs or resulted in speedier federal civil cases).
26 Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642,
4659 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1988»; see Henry J. Reske, Bill to Expand Arbitration
Defeated, A.BA J., Feb. 1994, at 22.
Z1 Robel, supra note 25, at 24-25. See generally LIND & SHAPARD, supra note 23.
28 Robel, supra note 25, at 25-26.
29 [d. at 26-27.
See generally DoRIS MARIE PROVINE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES (1986).
30 Robel, supra note 25, at 27-28; see also Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial
and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 463 (1984) (proposing
leaving trial process for "hard-core, durable, trial-bound cases").
31 Robel, supra note 25, at 28. See generally PROVINE, supra note 29.
32 See, e.g., Robel, supra note 25, at 34 (proposing examination of process and underlying
values before embracing ADR).
33 See generally E. Allan Lind & Benjamin R. Foster, Alternative Dispute Resolution in
the Federal Courts: Public and Private Options, 33 FED. B. NEWS & J. 127, 131 (1986)
(evaluating empirical research being undertaken in area of ADR).
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effect of the routine use of ADR procedures on
underlying legal norms is unknown, and that application of certain forms of ADR to some classes of
litigants and not others raises distributional concerns.34
Despite such reservations, according to champions ofADR, "[olver
the past two decades there has been a dramatic explosion of
interest among academics, the bar, and (most importantly) users of
legal services in ways that lawyers can help resolve disputes other
than through litigation.,,35
For the longest time, ADR methods were not widely used
throughout the federal court system for three reasons. First, a
widespread perception considered ajudicial determination superior
to any alternative. 36 Second, the bar was slow to embrace these
alternatives, although market forces seem to be moving attorneys
and clients away from a litigious mindset as litigation becomes
more costly in terms of expenses and delays.37 Third, any wholesale change required the active commitment of the federal government because of its prominent usage ofthe federal courts generally
and of the federal appellate process in particular.38
Whatever the intensity of the first two factors, the third factor
appears to be in somewhat ofa state of flux. In 1991, the executive
branch announced the Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America,
a report from the President's Council on Competitiveness, which
endorsed voluntary dispute resolution.39 By Executive Order
issued in October 1991, the President directed attorneys represent-

Robel, supra note 25, at 34.
JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., PRocESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE RoLE OF LAWYERS
xix (1989); see also CHRISTINE B. lIARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE-THE IDEOLOGY AND
INST1TUTIONAIJZATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO COURT (1985).
II Edwards, supra note 10, at 927.
37 Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 19.
M Patricia M. Wald, TM Problem with tM Courts:
Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or
Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 MD. L. REv. 766, 774 (1983). The United States is party
in more than one-third of the civil cases on the district courts' dockets. CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 22, at 113 (4th ed. 1983).
at PREsIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN
AMERICA 7 (Aug. 1991). See generally Dan Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV.
559 (1992) (outlining provisions of President's Council on Competitiveness).
U

M
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ing the United States to "make reasonable attempts to resolve ...
disputers] expeditiously and properly before proceeding to trial,"
and endorsed ADR when "feasible" or "appropriate."40 Recent
congressional proposals likewise go far toward recognizing that
"[a]ccess to an appropriate forum does not always require a public
hearing before a life-tenured judge operating under formal rules of
evidence and procedure. "41 There remains a profound need,
however, for standards for making the decision about allocating

40 Exec. Order No. 12,778,56 Fed. Reg. 55195, 55196 (1991). The Order, in relevant part,
reads as follows:
(c) Alternative Methods ofResolving the Dispute in Litigation. Litigation
counsel shall make reasonable attempts to resolve a dispute expeditiously and properly before proceeding to trial.
(1) Whenever feasible, claims should be resolved through informal
discussions, negotiations, and settlements rather than through utilization
ofany formal or structured Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) process
or court proceeding. At the same time, litigation counsel should be
trained in dispute resolution techniques and skills that can contribute to
the prompt, fair, and efficient resolution of claims. Where such benefits
may be derived, and after consultation with the agency referring the
matter, litigation counsel should suggest the use of an appropriate ADR
technique to the private parties.
(2) It is appropriate to use ADR techniques or processes to resolve
claims of or against the United States or its agencies, after litigation
counsel determines that the use of a particular technique is warranted
in the context of a particular claim or claims, and that such use will
materially contribute to the prompt, fair, and efficient resolution of the
claims.
(3) Litigation counsel shall neither seek nor agree to the use of
binding arbitration or any other equivalentADR technique. A technique
is equivalent to binding arbitration if an agency is bound, without
exercise of that agency's discretion, to implement the determination
mising from the ADR technique.••.
Id. It is too early to know the direction the new Administration will take. See generally Carl
Tobias, The Clinton Administration and Civil Justice Reform, 144 F.R.D. 437 (1993)
(providing overview of civil justice reform and possible issues that Clinton Administration
will address); Carl Tobias, Eucutive Branch Civil Justice Reform, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1521
(1993) (finding that Bush Administration initiatives warrant continued experimentation).
41 Griffin B. Bell, Crisis in the Courts: Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 3, 7
(1978); see also MaIjorie Lakin & Ellen Perkins, Note, Realigning the Federal Court
Caseload, 12 LoY. LA. L. REv. 1001, 1009-12 (1979) (outlining arbitration use on
experimental basis); cf. FED. R. Cw. P. 16(cX7) (stating that subjects discussed at pretrial
conference include "the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute").
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disputes between courts and ADR programs.42 Certainly, the most
important issues involving constitutional rights belong before an
Article III judge. On the secondary policy level, however, considerations such as the probability of error, the need for finality, the
cost/benefit ratio, public demand, and user satisfaction all ought to
affect the political allocation. 43
The most significant recent development for district court ADR
procedures was initiated by Congress in the form of the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990.44 This comprehensive legislation
requires each district court to implement a civil justice expense and
delay reduction plan. The plan is to be designed to facilitate the
deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the merits, to monitor the
discovery process, to improve overall litigation management, and to
foster the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of civil disputes.
One of the primary congressional directives in this statute is that
the district courts expand and enhance the use of ADR. 45 The
pilot districts, early implementation districts, and demonstration
districts, along with all the remaining districts, are busying

42 See Austin Sarat, The Role of Courts and the Logic of Court Reform: Notes on the
Justice Department's Approach to Improving Justice, 64 JUDICATURE 300, 307-08 (1981)
(suggesting channeling disputes to least costly mechanism).
~ Id.; see also Robert A. Baruch Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of
Civil Justice: Jurisdictional Principles for Process Choices, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 893.
44 Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 471-482). See generally The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the Judicial
Improvements Act of1990: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1990); Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act and Civil Justice
Reform Act: Hearing Before the House ofRepresentatives Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual
Property, and the Administration of Justice ofthe Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990). The 1990 Act has strong supporters but equally strong critics. Compare Joseph
R. Biden, Jr., Equal, Accessible, Affordable Justice Under Law: The Civil Justice Reform Act
of 1990, 1 CORN. J. L. & PuB. POL'y 1 (1992) (exploring ways to bring both speedy and equal
justice under law) with Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice,
77 MINN. L. REv. 375 (1992) (criticizing Civil Justice Reform Act because implementation
contained no "meaningful consultative review by the major users of the system") and Linda
S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and the Separation
ofPowers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283 (1993) (arguing Civil Justice Reform Act is unconstitutional
and will lead to "politicization ofthe judicial branch") and Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform
and the Balkanization ofFederal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1393 (1992) (arguing Civil
Justice Reform Act threatens federal civil procedure integrity).
415 See S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 27·30 (1990) (discussing four ADR
techniques); H.R. REP. No. 732, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1990) (citing studies finding that
ADR has "generally favorable results").
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themselves implementing this legislation. The experience under
the varied and diverse plans will provide a huge amount of data on
ADR, although it likely will be difficult to sort out the "Hawthorne
effect" of the plans.46
These developments in ADR are part of larger changes in the
legal culture of the United States. The federal courts are a central
part of that legal culture and they necessarily must respond to
changes in demographics, the economy, politics, and the life of the
nation. 47 As Chief Judge Breyer so presciently observed, however,
there remains a good deal of uncertainty about ADR and about how
many and which disputes ought to be resolved with judicial
procedures or by other alternative procedures.48 His key point is
that "[t]his uncertainty arises from the fact that one's objective, in
.a See Memoranda from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and the
Federal Judicial Center on the Implementation of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,
reprinted in 8 FIFTH CmcUlT REP. 1036 (1991) (providing information about the Act to assist
implementation); see also AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, LAWYERS CONFERENCE TASK FORCE ON
REDUCTION OF LITIGATION COST AND DELAY, DEFEATING DELAY-DEVELOPING AND
IMPLEMENTING A COURT DELAY REDUCTION PROGRAM (1986). See generally Don J. De
Benedictis, An Experiment in Reform, ABA J., Aug. 1992, at 16 (noting that much
experimentation deals with ADR); William K Slate II, Early Implementation Districts:
Pioneers and a Plethora of New Local Rules, 11 REV. LITIG. 367 (1992) (commenting on
expense and delay reduction reports in early implementation districts); Carl Tobias, Judicial
Oversight of Civil Justice Reform, 140 F.R.D. 49 (1992) (discussing implementation of the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990); Carl Tobias, Recalibrating the Civil Justice Reform Act,
30 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 115 (1993) (analyzing early reform efforts under the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990).
47 See generally Leo Dreyer, Litigation Management Proposals:
Storm Clouds for
Voluntary ADR?, 1990 J. DISP. RESOL. 293 (examining current reform proposals relating to
court-annexed ADR); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV.
3 (1986) (examining litigation in United States); Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the
Big Six; Or the Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 WIS. L. REv. 921 (studying
increase in caseloads in federal courts); Wolf Heydebrand & Carroll Seron, The Rising
Demand for Court Services: A Structural Explanation ofthe Caseload of u.s. District Courts,
11 JUST. SYS. J. 303 (1986) (analyzing changes in U.S. District Courts from 1904 to 1985);
Thomas B. Marvell, Caseload Growth-Past and Future Trends, 71 JUDICATURE 151 (1987)
(examining caseload growth); Michael J. Salts, Do We Really Know Anything About the
Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992)
(examining tort litigation system); Austin Sarat, The Litigation Explosion, Access to Justice,
and Court Reform: Examining the Critical Assumptions, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 319 (1985)
(examining theories guiding court reform activity); Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Are Courts Obsolete?,
67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1385 (1992) (contrasting the role of courts to other forms of dispute
resolution and proposing changes in the court system)•
.a Stephen Breyer, Administering Justice in the First Circuit, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 29,
44 (1990).
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seeking to resolve the disputes that lead to litigation, cannot be
their settlement alone, but rather, must be their just settlement."'9
Alternative dispute resolution holds out some promise for a longterm reduction in demand for federal judicial resources. It may
also allow for improved processing of some routine, fact-specific
grievances presently before federal courts. 50 If fully implemented
and fairly utilized, these applications could have a large positive
effect on the structure of our federal court system. It is safe to say
that this generation of federal courts is undergoing a basic
reorientation of civil procedure. There are some indications that
the legal culture is going about the task of reconceptualizing the
fundamental norms of dispute resolution. It remains to be seen if
all this will be carried so far as to stop thinking of ADR as an
alternative to judicial proceedings and to begin to think ofjudicial
proceedings as one of the many and varied alternatives to be
matched with appropriate disputes to achieve a just and efficient
resolution.
IV. CREATING CIRCUIT JUDGESHIPS
If demand for appellate judgepower is not decreased somehow,
the other alternative is to increase supply. This can be done to
some extent not by creating new circuit judgeships, but instead by
mining existing personnel resources represented by senior judges,
visiting judges, and district judges. Senior judges are those who
have retired from regular active service but remain eligible to sit
on a kind of voluntary basis.51 Because they are replaced by
active judges, their services are something of a bonus. 52 Senior
judges are relied on extensively now, however, and do not represent

4' [d.
Edwards, supra note 10, at 936.
28 U.S.C. § 294 (1988).
a2 See Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts ofAppeals: The Threat to the
Function ofReview and the National Law, 82 HARv. L. REV. 542, 563-64 (1969) (describing
role of senior judges).
60

at
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a likely source of additional appellate judgepower.53 Visiting
judges from other circuits do not increase the overall judge supply,
but they have been an important means for matching supply with
demand, especially in the larger, more threatened circuits. 54 This
practice serves to diffuse case congestion, but it is merely a shortterm adjustment. 55 Finally, federal district court judges may sit
on panels by special designation.56 Again, this device has been
used mostly by the large circuits facing the most severe docket
growth.57 Of the three pools-senior judges, visiting judges, and
district judges-recruiting from the ranks of district judges
represents the only significant long term supply of extra appellate
judgepower. More study and planning could maximize this
potential. For example, it might be feasible to add a large number
of judges at the district court level and then routinely designate
them to sit on three-judge panels of the courts of appeals. This
would be something of a variation of two historical practices: the
circuit court in the original design of the federal court system and
the three-judge district court of more contemporary times.
It might be suggested that the crisis of volume has exceeded
existing judge-staffing mechanisms. The relentless docket growth

But see J. Edward Lumbard, Current Problems of the Federal Courts of Appeals, 54
L. REV. 29, 33 (1968). Proposals to require retirement to increase the number of
senior judges available for service raise no small constitutional problem. See J. Earl Mlijor,
Why Not Mandatory Retirement for Federal Judges?, 52 A.BA J. 29 (1966).
54 28 U.S.C. §§ 46, 291 (1988); see United States v. Claiborne, 870 F.2d 1463, 1464-67 (9th
Cir. 1989) (rejecting argument that failure to poll all Ninth Circuit judges as to their
availability violated 28 U.S.C. § 292(d»: see also Carrington, supra note 52, at 565. The
Chief Justice has directed the Judicial Conference Committee on lntercircuit Assignments
to take a more proactive approach to sending judges where they are needed. Between
August and December 1991, for example, there were 82 intercircuit assignments, involving
62 Article TIl judges, among them two retired Associate Justices. Intercircuit Assignments
Help Courts Cope With Workload, THIRD BRANCH, May 1992, at 5. "Intercircuit assignments
meet emergency needs, supplement existing judicial resources, and help circuits cope with
extenuating circumstances that could include protracted cases, a case in which all judges of
the circuit disqualify themselves, or multiple cases transferred into the circuit." Id.
53 See Carrington, supra note 52, at 564-65 (arguing present system is incapable of
distributing the pressure ofcongestion as widely as possible). The visitingjudge has to come
from somewhere, so by definition the home court is disadvantaged. Furthermore, there is
an often unarticulated concern that a judge from another part of the country does not share
the legal culture in the visited court.
158 28 U.S.C. §§ 292-293, 295 (1988).
67 See Carrington, supra note 52, at 565.
63

CORNELL
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in the Fifth Circuit so routinely outstrips its judicial capacity that
in October 1991 then-Chief Judge Clark entered a "judicial
emergency order," still in effect, that waived indefinitely the
statutory requirement that the majority of a three-judge panel be
active judges from the home circuit court. 58
If the general appellate judgeship shortage continues to worsen,
it may not be too far-fetched to expect someone to suggest a short
term supply solution, previously relied on by state courts, to keep
appellate backlogs and delays from growing out of hand. Most of
the states have relied on lawyers to serve temporarily as judicial
adjuncts, pro bono publico.59 Although most of these programs
have been in the state trial courts of limited jurisdiction, the
enabling statutes in five states actually authorize the practice for
the state appellate bench, as well. GO In theory, on the appellate
level, this attorney-judge might serve along with two full-time
judges, to combine this idea with the two-judge panel idea. An
Article III judge and a lawyer-temporary judge could take the first
review and a second Article III judge would be called in to break
any ties. Things will have to become even more drastic than
presently imaginable, however, for someone to be taken seriously
to suggest that the federal court system borrow this practice.
Temporary appointments to Article III courts raise profound and
seemingly insurmountable constitutional problems. 61 Therefore,
without creating additional circuit judgeships, the reassignment of
existing Article III judges, primarily district judges, to appellate
hearing panels is the most that can be expected.
Two personnel developments at the district court level provide an
additional perspective on staffing the federal appellate bench. A

68 See 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1988) (requiring majority of panel to be judges of that court); see
also Gordon Hunter, 5th Circuit OKs Use ofMore Fill-in Judges, TEx. LAw., Dec. 9, 1991, at
4 (discussing confirmation of Harold R. DeMoss, Jr. to the Fifth Circuit). One of the related

problems is the torPidity with which the political branches fill existing judicial vacancies.
68 See generally ALExANDER B. AIKMAN ET AL., FRIENDS OF THE COURT-LAWYERS As
SUPPLEMENTAL JUDICIAL RESOURCES (1987) (arguing that volunteer lawyers ought to be used
to augment judicial resources).
80 ADVISORY BD. ON THE USE OF VOLUNTEER LAWYERS As SUPPLEMENTAL JUDICIAL
RESOURCES, NATL ern. FOR STATE COURTS, GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF LAWYERS TO
SUPPLEMENT JUDICIAL RESOURCES app. A, at 25-33 (1984).
81 See Virginia L. Richands, Temporary Appointments to the Federal Judiciary: Article
II Judges?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 702 (1985) (discussing these constitutional problems).
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dramatic growth in federal judgeships has occurred in the district
courts. During the 1960s and 1970s, their ranks increased more
than 100 percent in absolute numbers. 62 The trend continued
unabated through the 1980s. 63 Additionally, the number of
support personnel at the federal trial level increased substantially.
Reliance on what Judge Edwards calls special "subjudges"-masters, magistrate-judges, and bankruptcy judges-has increased the
supply of non-Article III decisionmakers, and their responsibilities
at the federal trial court level have grown as well. 64
Two related points concerning these trial court developments are
peculiarly relevant. First, the point deserves repeating that growth
at the intake court with original jurisdiction inevitably places
pressure on the appellate function. This is why large scale
reductions in the original jurisdiction of federal courts have the
potential to provide large dividends for appellate relief. Second, the
offered solution of "subjudges" has historically been rejected for the
courts of appeals, and many argue properly SO.65 Permanent
adjuncts are seen by some as undesirable in a court of error with
an incidental but important lawmaking function. This line of
argument intersects the background debate over the creation of the
appellate magistrate, whose possible duties have been the subject
ofkeen debate. Here again, developments at the district court level
may well be instructive. Limited use of senior judges, visiting
judges, and district judges is to be first preferred. 66 But, in the
62 Carrington, supra note 52, at 565; see also David S. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis ofFederal District Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL.
L. REv. 65, 71 (1981). Since the turn of the century, there has been an 83% increase in the
ratio of federal trial judges to the U.S. population. Id.
83 See POSNER, supra note 10, at 353-57.
64 Clark, supra note 62, at 144-45; Edwards, supra note 10, at 879-80.
116 Bankruptcy appellate panels, consisting ofthree bankruptcy judges, can hear appeals
from the Bankruptcy Court before a second appeal to the court of appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 158
(1988); see Michael A. Berch, The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and Its Implications for
Adoption of Specialist Panels in the Courts of Appeals, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE-THE
INNOVATION OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE FuTuRE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 165 (Arthur
D. Hellman ed., 1990) (arguing that courts of appeals should follow the system for review
used in bankruptcy cases); Richard H. Deane & Valerie Tehan, Judicial Administration in
the United States Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit, 11 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1, 16·17
(1981) (arguing that these panels have been working well).
116 See Daniel J. Meador, The Federal Judiciary-Inflation, Malfunction, and Proposed
Course of Action, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 617, 647-48 (arguing that non·Article III judicial
officers and acljuncts have raised concerns that "the quality of acljudication may be eroded
W
).
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long run, appeals ideally ought to be decided by permanent, active
circuit judges from the particular circuit as much as possible. 67
This manner of staffing helps to ensure the realization of one
coherent law of the circuit supported by a majority of its judges.
This is a vital feature of the federal appellate tradition. 68
On the supply side of solutions, creating more circuit judgeships
already has had the practical effect of changing the federal
appellate function, and if Congress continues this ad hoc approach,
it promises to exacerbate many of the problems of bigness in the
courts of appeals. The Framers of the Constitution contemplated
a minimal number of federal judges to staff a few courts of quite
limited jurisdiction. Alexander Hamilton, perhaps naively or
perhaps disingenuously, wrote in Federalist No. 81 of a single
federal judge in only "four or five, or half a dozen federal districts. n69 Today we have ninety-four federal districts with 649
federal judgeships.70 During their first decade, the nine courts of
appeals were assigned thirty judgeships;71 today there are thirteen
federal circuits with 179 circuit judgeships.72 Increases have
followed the congressional palliative of dealing with caseload
growth by creating judgeships. This has been the most frequent
and predictable congressional response to caseload growth. Even
so, the growth of the appellate bench still has not kept pace.
Circuit judges have been delivered in litters by omnibus acts, and
the litters have been getting larger. Ten new circuit judgeships
were created in 1961;73 only five years later, six more were added;7<& two years later thirteen more;75 in 1978 thirty-five new

17 Lumbard, supra note 53,. at 33.
"Id.
ee THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 547 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961). This line
of argument has been adapted, with permission, from Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing
Circuit Boundaries-Why the Proposal to Divide the United States Court ofAppeals for the
Ninth Circuit Is Not Such a Good Idea, 22 ARIz. ST. L.J. 917, 947-50 (1990).
10 See 28 U.S.CoA. § 133 (West 1994) (establishing numbers ofdistrictjudges). This figure
includes thirteen temporary judgeships. See Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 203(c), 104 Stat. 5089,
5101 (1990) (establishing temporary judgeships).
11 Carrington, supra note 52, at 580 n.165.
12 28 U.S.CoA. § 44(a) (West 1994). Between 1900 and 1988, the population ofthe United
States tripled and the number of appeals increased thirty-four-fold.
11 Act of May 19,1961, Pub. L. No. 87-36, 75 Stat. 80 (1962).
14 Act of Mar. 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-372, 80 Stat. 75 (1967).
16 Act of June 18, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-347, 82 Stat. 184 (1969).
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circuit judgeships were created;76 in 1984, after incremental
additions in 1982 and 1983 were insufficient, another twenty-four
judgeships were added;77 in 1990, the most recent but certainly
not the last litter of eleven circuit judgeships was delivered. 78
Adding judges is a way to respond to growth in caseload, of
course, but this ad hoc solution may contribute more to the
problems of the large court. The turn-of-the-century design for
consistency and harmony in the law-that the same three-judge
panel would decide all the appeals in a circuit-passed from the
scene a long, long time ago. (No one is heard today to advocate
sixty circuits of three-judge panels.) Today there are thousands of
permutations of three-judge panels in the large courts of appeals.
The courts of appeals average thirteen judges; the Ninth Circuit
has twenty-eight judgeships; only the First Circuit has fewer than
nine judgeships, which for the longest time was thought the
maximum. 79 Monitoring the law becomes more onerous. Intracircuit conflicts become more likely. En banc rehearings, which
developed as the traditional mechanism to maintain the unity of
the law of the circuit, become unwieldy.so Relationships of judge
to judge, panel to panel, and panel to en banc court become more
complex and tenuous. 81
Worse, adding circuit judgeships does not achieve any lasting
improvement. A detailed study ofprior omnibus judgeship statutes
found only a one-year impact on the appeals-per-panel ratio.82

Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (1980).
Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 346 (1986).
78 Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 202, 104 Stat. 5098, 5098-99.
79
28 U.S.CoA § 44(a) (West 1994). But see Jon O. Newman, 1,000 Judges-the Limit for
an Effective Federal Judiciary, 76 JUDICATURE 187, 188 (1993) ("1 believe a federal court of
appeals begins to have its effective functioning impaired as its size moves past nine.")
80 See Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr., Fifth Circuit Court ofAppeals Reorganization Act of1980,
1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 523, 526-28 (discussing division of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
and its effects); Albert Tate, Jr., The Last Year ofthe ·Old"Fifth (1891-1981), 27 LoY. L. REV.
689, 690-93 (1981) (discussing difficulty ofen banc consideration with over twenty judges on
the "old" Fifth Circuit).
81 See Edwards, supra note 10, at 918-19; Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 10-11.
82 MCLAUCHLAN, supra note 2, at 107 ("The increase injudges only delayed what appears
to be a nearly inexorable climb in appeals taken to the courts of appeals."). See generally
Howard T. Markey, On the Present Deterioration of the Federal Appellate Process: Never
Another Learned Hand, 33 S.D. L. REV. 371 (1988) (discussing the importance of the federal
appellate courts and their deterioration).
78

77
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The major benefit thus has been merely a kind of temporary
braking effect, which is quickly overwhelmed. At the same time,
to continue merely adding judges to the presently structured circuit
system will worsen the unintended effects on the courts of appeals,
individually and collectively. Increasing the number of circuit
judgeships, within the existing structure, should be a reform oflast
resort. 83 This is the view of concerned circuit judges. In March
1989, the Eleventh Circuit Judicial Council passed a formal and
unanimous resolution to ask Congress not to add any more circuit
judgeships, despite statistical-caseload justifications, because the
judges feared that their bench simply would grow too large.84
Moreover, economic concerns may make Congress a more
reluctant midwife, as new judgeships become more expensive in an
era of ever-tightening budgets. According to official estimates, the
initial one-time investment to create a single circuit judgeship is
approximately $630,000. 85 Maintaining a circuit judge, with
chambers and staff, adds an estimated $814,000 to the national
budget each year. 86 Even on the national order of magnitude,
delivering a large litter of new circuit judgeships is an expensive
proposition over time. It might be said that a million dollars here
and a million dollars there begins to add up over the years. 87

83 Howell Heflin, Fifth Circuit Court ofAppeals Reorganization Act of 198(}-()verdue
Relief for an Overworked Court, 11 CUMB. L. REV. 597, 616 (1980-81) (citation omitted)
("Congress recognize[s] that a point is reached where the addition ofjudges decreases the
effectiveness of the court, complicates the administration of uniform law, and potentially
diminishes the quality of justice within a circuit."); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Bureaucracy-The Carcinoma of the Federal Judiciary, 31 ALA. L. REV. 261, 270 (1980).
S4 ChiefJudge Paul H. Roney, Remarks at the 1989 Judicial Conference of the Fifth and
Eleventh Judicial Circuits (May 8, 1989); Letter from Chief Judge Paul H. Roney to Ralph
Mecham, Director of the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts (Mar. 2,1989).
85 Irving R. Kaufman, New Remedies for the Next Century of Judicial Reform: Time as
the Greatest Innovator, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 253, 258 (1988). Of course, inflation since
renders this estimate on the low side.
85 GoRDON BERMANT ET AL., IMPoSING A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER OF FEDERAL
JUDGES: AN ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS 36 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1993).
Furthermore, "[b]ecause the contribution ofnew judges is overstated, the huge financial and
social costs imposed by new judges is hard to justify. Surely, such funds could be more
effectively employed to increase the productivity ofour existingjudges." Gerald Bard Tjoflat,
More Judges, Less Justice, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 70, 73.
87 Admittedly, the additional expenses ofa circuitjudgeship are a relatively inconsequential sum in the national budget. PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 199 (1976).
But it is at least a footnoteworthy digression to point out that every item in the federal
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The corresponding not-so-hidden qualitative costs of expanding
the federal appellate bench seem very high. As Judge Kaufman
has remarked, "The government's ability to attract and retain
capable judges is, at least partially, inversely proportional to the
size of the federal judiciary."88 Part of the prestige of the judgeships on the courts of appeals has been their relative rarity. Until
this generation, the authorized number of lifetime appointments
was fewer than the number of U.S. Senators. The sincere concern
is not that a judgeship would go begging but that lowered perceptions would attract lesser judges. An alternative worry is that
having a huge number of judgeships would result in an on-going
need for large numbers of nominations and confIrmations, which
could have the cumulative effect of devaluing these occasions for
the political branches, which in turn could lower the quality of the
federal bench. While this may not have happened yet, the concern
is often voiced, more often than not by the judges themselves.89
Indeed, there are some observers who worry off the record that in
fact it already has happened.
Concerns about large benches divide the judges. In a recent poll,
the circuit judges were asked to choose between adding judges, as

budget can be subdivided into inconsequential component sums. Even the largest and most
expensive and most elaborate weapons system can be broken down into sub·unit costs to
suggest a marginal financial inconsequence compared to the total budget. The point is that
the federal budget is the sum total of these inconsequential sums, and the federal judiciary
makes its own contribution to government expense, and presumably government waste. Still
the argument is relative and contextual:
[T]he cost of operating the judicial system is an infinitesimal part of our
national expenditures. We spend only three·tenths of 1 percent of our
federal budget on our court system. We spend almost as much on one
Stealth bomber as we do on the whole federal judicial system. We could
run the entire federal judiciary for 15 years on the cost of a single space
station.
Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal Courts-Too Few Judges, Too Many CaseB,
A.BA J., Jan. 1993, at 52, 53·54 [hereinafter Reinhart, A Plea to Save the Federal CourtB].
See also Stephen Reinhardt, Whose Federal Judiciary IB It Anyway?, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REV.
1 (1993) (hereinafter Reinhardt, Whose Judiciary?].
88 Kaufman, supra note 85, at 260·61 (citing Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Elbert,
348 U.S. 48, 59 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring»; see Edwards, Bupra note 10, at 918.
lit E.g., Kaufman, Bupra note 85, at 261 (noting that "an influx of new judges is bound to
devalue the judicial currency"); Markey, Bupra note 82, at 371 (noting deterioration of the
federal judiciary); Newman, supra note 79, at 187 (noting that an increase in number of
judges will lead to a decrease in quality).
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the caseload grows, or not adding judges, as the backlog grew
longer: 52% preferred adding judges; 33% would resist adding
judges, even if their workload increased; 11% would resist adding
judges, even if the backlog continued to grow.90 These attitudes
represent values in transition during a period of keen debate over
whether the nation can afford the costs and benefits of an elite
federal judiciary.91
The case for a small elite federal bench was made by the Federal
Courts Study Committee. The Study Committee expressed the
concern that an indefinite expansion of the federal judiciary would
take away from the prestige of the courts themselves:
The independence secured to federal judges by
Article III is compatible with responsible and efficient performance of judicial duties only if federal
judges are carefully selected from a pool ofcompetent
and eager applicants and only if they are sufficiently
few in number to feel a personal stake in the consequences of their actions. Neither condition can be
satisfied if there are thousands of federal judges.92
The Study Committee went on to insist that "[e]ven if a highly
competent federal judiciary consisting of thousands ofjudges could
be created and maintained, the coordination of so many judges
would be extraordinarily difficult."93 There are two underlying

eo Robel, supra note 25, at 41 n.153.
See generally Michael Wells, Against an Elite Federal Judiciary: Comments on the
Report ofthe Federal Courts Study Committee, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 923. But see Newman,
supra note 79, at 194 ("[T]he federal court system was established for a special task. It was
not created to be just like the state court systems, but instead to be a relatively small,
specialized institution of distinction.").
It STUDY COMMlTl'EE REPORT, supra note 22, at 7.
ta [d. The Report continued:
The more trial judges there are, the more appeals judges there must be;
the more appeals judges there are, the higher the rate ofappeal, because
it becomes more difficult to predict the behavior of the appellate court;
the more appeals there are, the more difficult it is for the Supreme Court
to maintain some minimum uniformity offederal decisional law, because
its capacity to review decisions of the lower federal courts is limited.
Even the maintenance of the necessary minimum uniformity of law
within a single circuit becomes problematic if there are a great many
•1
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policy questions.94 First, how great are the benefits of an elite
federal judiciary? Second, can the nation continue to afford an elite
federal judiciary? Ultimately, these questions must be answered by
Congress. When Congress takes the measure of what has happened to the courts of appeals and looks for solutions for the
problems facing the federal courts, the decision may come down to
a choice between doing nothing or trying to return to a lost
tradition, an ideal that already has passed from the scene. 95
Pay scale and work conditions are also part of the picture.
Higher private sector salaries and negative perceptions of the
federal appellate treadmill can influence highly qualified judicial
candidates to decline to serve. 96 Although recent judicial pay
raises have blunted much of the worry in this regard, a different
worry for the coherence and uniformity in the law will be heard if
more circuit judges are added to the system as it is now structured
and administered. 97 Setting aside the less tangible loss of collegiality, the instability of the law grows geometrically with the
addition of judges. Not just an evil in itself, such instability also
increases the workload as more panel rehearings and en banc
courts are required, and the uncertainty of outcomes creates an
judges in that circuit, and while this problem can be alleviated by
increasing the number ofcircuits, the result is to increase the number of
intercircuit conflicts and hence the burden on the Supreme Court.
Id. The Judicial Conference of the United States endorsed the following resolution in 1990:
[T]o support the concept of maintaining a relatively small Article III
judiciary through limitations on the jurisdiction and caseload of the
courts, but [to] oppose . . . any efforts to set a maximum limit on the
number of Article III judgeships.
BERMANT ET AL., supra note 86, at 14-15 (quoting Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, Sept. 12, 1990, at 93).
94 Wells, supra note 91, at 934-50.
!l5 Id. at 956-57.
!l5 See generally John M. Slack, Commentary-Funding the Federal Judiciary, 82 W. VA.
L. REV. 1 (1979); Robert A. Sprecher, The Threat to Judicial Independence, 51lND. L.J. 380
(1976) (discussing judicial resignations based on economic considerations); Note, Compensation of the Federal Judiciary: A Reexamination, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 594, 599 n.82 (1975)
(citing examples of federal judges leaving bench for higher private practice salaries).
97 See CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 87, at 199·200 ("[G]iven the present structure of
the federal appellate courts, more judgeships threaten the workability of en banc procedure
and the development of a uniform law of the circuit."). Former Attorney General Smith
expressed the concern that "[i]ncreasing the number of decision-makers issuing opinions
threatens uniformity, evenhandedness, and stability in the application of the law." William
French Smith, The Role of the Federal Courts, CASE & COM., Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 10,12.
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incentive for litigants to bring even more appeals. 98 Chief Judge
1Joflat of the Eleventh Circuit explained these sequential developments:
One of the biggest problems facing the federal
judiciary is the instability of the rule of law that
results when we create great number.s of additional
judgeships. .The more judges we create at the
appellate level, the larger we make courts of appeals,
the more unstable the law becomes. If you have
three judges on a court of appeals, the law is stable.
It is stable for litigants, lawyers, and district judges.
The outcome of a suit, should one be med, is predictable. When you add the fourth judge to that court,
you add some instability to the rule of law in that
circuit because another point of view is added to the
decision making. When you add the fifth judge, the
sixth judge, when you get as large as the old Fifth
Circuit was, with twenty-six judges, the law becomes
extremely unstable. One of several thousand different panel combinations will decide the case, will
interpret the law. Even if the court has a rule, as we
did in the old Fifth, that one panel cannot overrule
another, a court of twenty-six will still produce
irreconcilable statements of the law.
This tremendous potential for instability in the
rule of law creates a great deal of litigation. So you
have a situation where you add judges to dispose of
more cases, and at the court of appeals level, at
least, the new judges may well cause more litigation
than they can terminate. 99
The basic problem is not with numbers, but with priorities.
Increasing the number of judgeships ought to be a reform of last
Edwards, supra note 10, at 918·19; Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 11.
Interview with Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat, in THIRD BRANCH, Apr. 1983, at I, 3-4; see
also Tjoflat, supra note 86, at 70 (arguing that increased court size results in decreased
productivity of individual judges and lessening of clarity and stability in the law, thus
resulting in increased litigation).
II
M
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resort. 1OO The unintended effects of such a "quick fIx" are demonstrated by the unintended yet unalterable change in the basic
structure of the courts of appeals. 10l To go on simply adding
judges to the current structure is itself a deceptively simple
solution with serious negative consequences. The important issues
become how to determine when an increase is necessary and
whether some diseconomy of scale suggests a point beyond which
the system cannot go without fully and fInally destroying what
remains of the received federal appellate tradition.
The current methodology for determining when to add new
judgeships is surprisingly uncomplicated. The Judicial Conference
surveys the caseload needs of federal courts every four years and
makes recommendations to Congress to create judgeships, based on
the use of rough workload formulae. l02 After that, the political
process operates like a black box to create judgeships.l03 The
addition of permanent Article III positions should always be a
matter for serious study. A multi-faceted analysis of need should
be developed. l04 A 1981 Federal Judicial Center study considered
the failings of the present approach and suggested several reforms. 105 Admitting the difficulty of assessing judgeship need, the
study nonetheless faulted the present system.106 First, the time
lag in the present practice between identifying the need and the
creation of a judgeship renders the new position less effective. The

Higginbotham, supra note 83, at 270.
ld. at 271. Arguments for a cap on the number of federal judges are "based on [the)
concern that if the present expansion continues unchecked, we will destroy the unitary
nature ofthe federal judicial system. Even a casual historian knows that this was the raison
d'etre for the establishment of the federal courts." Delores K Sloviter, The Judiciary Needs
Judicious Growth, NAT'L L.J., June 28,1993, at 17.
102 The judicial needs of the country do not always playa controlling or even prominent
role in the political process. For example, Congress allowed the needs to build until the
Democrats recaptured the White House and then raised the appellate positions from 97 to
132 in 1978. J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL
SYsTEM 270 (1981).
103 ld.
1M See generally TASK FORCE ON PRINCIPLES FOR AsSESSING TijE ADEQUACY OF JUDICIAL
RESOURCES, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, AssESSING THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL RESOURCEs-GUIDELINES FOR A NEW PROCESS (Preliminary Draft 1983) (discussing state trial courts
of general jurisdiction).
1015 CARL BAAR, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., JUDGESHIP CREATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS:
OPTIONS FOR REFORM (1981); see also BERMANT ET AL., supra note 86, at 8-9.
106 BERMANT ET AL., supra note 86, at 2-4.
100

101
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process only contemplates positions already needed. There is no
effort at prediction. This assures that supply will always lag
behind demand for judgeships. Second, legislative litters ofjudges
cause severe assimilation problems in terms of confirmation,
orientation, staff, and office space. 107 Third, the present system
has increased dependence on ajudgepower strategy to the exclusion
of other methods of coping with caseloads.
The narrow emphasis on judgeship creation has been the result
of a felt need, often merely reflexive, to have sufficient judgepower
to handle case filings. lOB In terms of the appellate ideal, the
optimum number of federal judgeships might be theoretically
determined by the concept of the role fashioned for the federal
109
COurts.
Judicial hierarchy mostly is determinative. Federalism
defines that role vis-a.-vis state courts. Assessments of federal
judgeship needs ought to be addressed within the larger context of
federal jurisdiction and the role of the federal courts. Clearly, only
Congress should make these assessments and final adjustments.
Moving to an analysis focusing on the legislative process of
judgeship creation, the Federal Judicial Center study made
recommendations for overcoming perceived inadequacies in what
might be called the political black box of the status quo:

1. Authority to create federal court judgeships
should be delegated to the Judicial Conference of the
107 A broader policy question of separation of powers is whether the executive's impact
on the federal judiciary should be paced along presidencies. [d. at 3. Chief Judge Sloviter
of the Third Circuit concludes, "[l]ncreases in these courts, even ifjustified by the caseload,
should be made only incrementally, limited to 15 percent to 20 percent every three years."
Sloviter, 8upra note 101, at 18.
101 Congress has "neglect[ed] important considerations of organizational dynamics and
judicial purpose." BAAR, 8upra note 105, at 46.
101 [d. at 47. Judge Reinhardt argues:
My proposal is simply that Congress double the size of the courts of
appeals. I base this not on studies or statistics, but on practical
knowledge and experience. I think that the current system of determining when new judges will be added on the basis of workload surveys has
led us all down the wrong track. A totally fresh look is required.

I believe that we have already compromised the quality of justice
beyond the point oftoleration-160 federal appellate judges is simply far
too small a number for a nation of over 240 million people.
Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal Courts, supra note 87, at 53-54.
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United States.
2. The Judicial Conference should develop explicit
and public procedures for the exercise of this new
authority.
3. Judgeship creation should be limited to no more
than eight additional positions per year.
4. The Judicial Conference should have authority to
shift judgeships from one district or circuit to another, by ruling that the next vacancy in a designated
district or circuit not be filled.
5. No additional judgeships should be created in a
year in which overall federal case fIlings have declined, provided that judgeships can be shifted as
proposed in item 4.
6. Congress can veto in whole or in part the actions
taken by the Judicial Conference under the authority
conferred above, by simple resolution passed within
ninety days of Conference submission of its recommendations to the House and Senate. 110
This proposed reform has some problems, but it represents a
substantial improvement over the ad hoc process now in place. ll1
Of course, there is no good reason to expect Congress will ever
delegate Article III patronage. And there are good constitutional
and policy reasons why it should not.
A fmal issue on judgeship creation is whether, going beyond a
filings-per-judge focus, aD. overall institutional limit exists on the
number of appellate judges beyond which stability and coherence
are not possible. It seems evident that the present circuit structure
has a finite capacity for absorbing new judgeships. As a matter of
110 BAAR, supra note 105, at 48. Number six may pose constitutional problems that were
not evident when the study was conducted. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-59 (1983)
(ruling unconstitutional an immigration statute provision authorizing single House of
Congress to invalidate decision of executive branch regarding deportation).
111 See generally Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, Court Reform and
Access to Justice: A Legislative Perspective, 16 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 301 (1979) (surveying five
different policy approaches taken in response to increased court caseloads); Abner J. Mikva,
More Judgeships-But Not All at Once, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 23 (1982) (opining that
legislative response to increased judicial caseload is too slow to be effective and suggesting
some power be delegated to judiciary itself).

HeinOnline -- 28 Ga. L. Rev. 890 1993-1994

1994]

EXTRAMURAL REFORMS

891

philosophy, Justice Frankfurter recognized that federal judgeships
should not be considered a limitless resource. 112 At some point,
the courts of appeals would become a "Tower of Babel" with too
many circuits and too many judges to pursue effectively their
appellate ideal and system function. 113 Inserting a fourth tier,
with or without appellate subject matter specialization, would make
it possible for a greater number of circuit judges to work together
in a rational, coherent way. Even such revised systems, however,
will eventually encounter limits of scale.
Chief Judge Breyer recently took the time to explain the systemwide disadvantages to what may seem like an obvious solution to
simply add circuit judgeships.114 At the appellate level, the
problem is functional. If the courts of appeals existed only to

The consequences that [the expanding federal caseloadl entails for the
whole federal judicial system •.• cannot be met by a steady increase in
the number of federal judges. . .. The function and role of the federal
courts and the nature oftheir judicial process involve impalpable factors,
subtle but far-reaching, which cannot be satisfied by enlarging the
judicial plant. • •• In the farthest reaches of the problem a steady
increase in judges does not alleviate; in my judgment, it is bound to
depreciate the quality of the federal judiciary and thereby adversely to
affect the whole system.
Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 58-59 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). See also FRIENDLY, supra note 9, at 44-46; Robert H. Bork, Dealing with the
Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231, 234 (1976) (listing detrimental results,
including decreased prestige and collegiality, from increased number ofjudges).
113 Meador, supra note 66, at 642. Judge Newman argues:
In sum, a federal judiciary of no more than 1,000 judges will be of
generally high quality in both personnel and performance, with only a
modest bureaucracy. There will be a tolerable number of circuits, with
courts of appeals of tolerable size. The body of federal law will be
reasonably coherent, and the Supreme Court will be able to maintain
uniformity of federal law. A federal judiciary rising above 1,000 and
heading for 3,000 judges will be of lesser quality and dominated by a
burgeoning bureaucracy of law clerks, staff counsel, magistrate judges,
and other ancillary personnel. It will be divided into an unmanageable
number of circuits or plagued by appellate courts of unmanageable size,
with an incoherent body offederallaw and a Supreme Court substantially incapable of maintaining uniformity of federal law.
Newman, supra note 79, at 194.
114 Breyer, supra note 48, at 37-40; see also Kaufman, supra note 85, at 259 (citing en
banc proceedings, with typical resulting delay needed to forge consensus, as example ofneed
for fewer judges). See generally Leonard J. Nelson III, Federalism and the Judicial Process:
A Survey ofJudicialAdministration in the United States Courts ofAppeals, 18 GoNZ. L. REV.
53,72-73 (1982-83) (listing specific numbers of federal judgeships added from 1961 to 1978).
112
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correct error, the system might be able to absorb an unlimited
number of circuit judges. u5 Indeed, consider that over the last
century the structure has absorbed the addition of 149 judges to the
original complement ofthirty. The structural problem with adding
circuit judgeships comes into play in the law-declaring function. A
court of appeals "must explain, clarify, and develop the law.
Insofar as it does so, other courts, the bar, and those subject to its
jurisdiction, must follow what it says, and others outside of its
jurisdiction may also read its opinions and find guidance."U6
ChiefJudge Breyer identifies three serious disadvantages to the socalled solution of adding appellate judges to deal with caseload
growth. ll7 First, he refers to the point made earlier that having
too many judges will lessen the opportunity for the appellate courts
to speak authoritatively. Conflicts among the circuits that disagree
on the rule oflaw that ought to apply are only part of the problem,
although a serious and visible part. There are other, more subtle,
less detectable conflicts Chief Judge Breyer describes: "decisions
involv[ing] other sorts of rules, rules that grow out of the facts at
hand, that arise out of the use of an example."U8 Second, he
suggests that law professors, students, and practicing attorneys
simply cannot keep up with the 15,000 appellate opinions written
annually by circuit judges. As a consequence, "federal law lacks
the criticism necessary for modification and development. "119
Third, such a large and unwieldy system will more and more work
to the advantage of those with the resources to take advantage of
its size-large law firms, institutional litigators, and the government-to the disadvantage of others. 12o
Furthermore, what data we have should discourage Congress
from adding circuit judgeships to deal with case load. In 1950,
when there were sixty-four circuit judgeships, 2.5% of the terminations in the district courts were appealed, a 1:40 ratio. In 1989,
when there were 165 circuit judgeships, 13% of the terminations

Breyer, supra note 48, at 37-38.
118Id. at 37.
117 Id. at 38-40.
118Id. at 38.
119 Id. at 39.
120 Id. at 40.
115
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were appealed, a 1:8 ratio. 121 These statistics suggest that appellants today are much more willing to take an appeal and gamble
that a three-judge panel will set aside their trial court defeat. The
widely shared perception apparently is that the odds for reversal
are better today.
The projections we have are quite disturbing in this regard. In
1975, one federal jurisdiction seer predicted that in the twenty-first
century, 5000 circuit judges would be filling 1000 volumes of
Federal Reporter, Umpteenth Series, disposing of approximately a
million appeals-each and every year. 122 More recent estimates
from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts predict
an increase from 38,000 filings in 1988 to 66,000 filings by the year
2000. 123 Increases in filings of this magnitude will render the
wholesale creation of additional judgeships inevitable. 124 There
are bound to be numerously more litters of circuit judges and the
litters are bound to be much larger between now and the not-toodistant end of the century.
This inevitability raises in turn the question of whether there is

121 Vincent Flanagan, Appellate Court Caseloads: A Statistical Overview Table 9 (1989),
reprinted in 2 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMTITEE WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITrEE
REPORTS (July I, 1990). See also Posner, supra note 10, at 82 (providing comparative appeal
rates for 1960 and 1983).
To fully explore all the implications of these figures would require an analysis beyond the
scope of the present study. It would take into account such factors as the federalization of
state criminal procedure and the expansion of federal constitutional rights, including the
right of access to courts and the right of counsel on appeal in criminal matters. Statutory
developments, such as the recent jurisdiction to review federal criminal sentences,likewise
are implicated. On the civil side of the appellate docket, one might speculate that the cases
that make it through the trial system are the least likely candidates for settlement and the
marginal costs of an appeal often are small compared to the judgment that is at stake.
Finally, perceptions that the law is less predictable and the chances for reversal are better,
particularly in the larger courts of appeals, may contribute to the higher rate of appeals.
Further speculations must be left; for another time.
122 John H. Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REv. 567, 567 (1975).
123 Statement Submitted by the Circuit Executive, U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit,
reprinted in Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals Reorganization Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 948
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 340, 342 (1990) [hereinafter Ninth Circuit Executive
Statement]. "In this decade, we will decide whether in the next century the federal judicial
system will remain at a size that enables it to be true to its purpose, or become a vast
faceless bureaucracy that will undermine the very need to have a federal judiciary."
Newman, supra note 79, at 194.
124 Ninth Circuit Executive Statement, supra note 123.
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some absolute maximum size of a court sitting in panels. l25 A
committee of the Judicial Conference fIxed on the number nine in
1964, apparently based on the numerology of the Supreme Court
that became revelation after the failure of the 1937 court-packing
plan.126 The Judicial Conference's last official position, in 1974,
was to set the maximum per court of appeals at fIfteen judgeShipS.127 Today, only the First Circuit (6 judgeships) is below the
1964 limit; and the Third Circuit (14), Fourth Circuit (15), Fifth
Circuit (17), Sixth Circuit (16), and Ninth Circuit (28), have all
reached or surpassed the limit set in 1974.128 So much for such
limits. Most certainly, more study is called for. 129 This issue
needs to be addressed directly by judges and legislators.
The congressional extramural strategy of adding judges does
show some signs of playing out. 130 Enlarging the federal judiciary
is costly. It places strains on the appointment process and makes
more likely the possibility that unqualifIed or unworthy candidates
will be given life tenure. A larger appellate judiciary results
inevitably in more conflicting opinions, which in turn create greater
uncertainty and generate more litigation. The larger the appellate
bench, the less familiar and less collegial the judges become, and
the esprit de corps suffers along with their work product. As the
opportunity for individual contribution and recognition diminishes,
so too do accountability and the attractiveness and prestige of the
position. The Federal Courts Study Committee dramatically
described the current situation:

126 Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts ofAppeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay
on Delegation and Specialization ofthe Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 762 (1983);
see also CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3510, at 45 (1984).
126 REPoRTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
15 (1964). But see REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 9 (1968) (recommending 13 and 15 judges respectively for the Ninth and
Fifth Circuits).
127 REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES

48 (1974).
128 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (Supp. IV 1992) (establishing current judgeship levels).
129 "In the absence ofsuch [empirical] evidence, the maximum number ofjudges who can
sit on a single circuit will remain a matter of guesswork••••" AMERICAN BAR Ass'N,
STANDING COMM. ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS, THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF
APPEALS: REEXAMINING STRUCTURE AND PROCESS AFTER ACENTURY OF GROWTH 9-10 (1989).
130 Baker, supra note 69, at 949.
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In the past three decades the number of appellate
judges nationally has almost trebled, ranging now
from six in the First Circuit to twenty-eight in the
Ninth. The average court of appeals has thirteen
judges. If caseload were the sole determinant, and
using the Judicial Conference's 255 participations
standard, there would today be 206 judgeships for
the twelve regional circuits, not the present 156.
The average court would have seventeen judges, and
at least four of the courts would be on the brink of
twenty judgeships. Applying the same standard to
conservative caseload projections suggests a need by
1999 for 315 appellate judges, with an average court
of twenty-four judges (and forty-nine on the Ninth
Circuit). Tribunals of seventeen, much less twentyfour, sitting in panels of three, may resemble a
judgeship pool more than a single body providing
unified circuit leadership and precedent. Still, large
courts such as these may be workable. Whether
tribunals of thirty or forty judges will be workable is
more problematic. The question is not simply one of
administration but of the effect, both within the
circuit and nationally, of so many uncoordinated
opinions from so many judges.131

A few years ago, Judge Posner suggested a moratorium on the
creation of district court judgeships.132 Because the trial courts
are operating near capacity and the courts of appeals presently are
roughly keeping pace, his suggestion would have the practical,

131 STUDY COMMITI'EE REPORT, supra note 22, at 114. The same projection would predict
a need for 392 circuit judges by 2009 (33 per circuit with the Fifth at 49 and the Ninth at
61 judges). Flanagan, supra note 121, at Table 22. If any trend is discernable, these
predictions have become more dire over the years. See J. Clifford Wallace, Working
Paper-Future ofthe Judiciary, 94 F.R.D. 225, 228 n.4 (1981) (estimating that by year 2000
there would be 289 circuit judges).
132 Posner, supra note 125, at 765-67. "There is general recognition today that there is
a natural upper limit on the number offederal court ofappeals judges and that we are either
near, or have already exceeded, that limit." [d. at 762; see also MCLAUCHLAN, supra note 2,
at 109, 201·02 (suggesting that adding judgeships is only a temporary solution to caseload
problems).
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statistical effect of suspending appellate docket growth. The
district court case-queuing that would result from such a Colonel
Travis-style line-drawing at the trial level in theory would force the
type of system overhaul federal jurisdictio~ sorely needs. Because
Congress has even less to overcome to create a district judgeship,
it is highly unlikely that the line will be drawn there.
Several circuit judges have engaged in a remarkable recent
public debate about the feasibility and advisability of Congress
declaring a moratorium on the creation ofjudgeships at the courts
of appeals level. 133 The arguments are elaborate, but the political
reality is simple. 134 Congress will never impose a moratorium on

183 Judge Newman ofthe Second Circuit favors a moratorium to limit the overall number
of federal judges to about 1000. Newman, supra note 79. Judge Reinhardt of the Ninth
Circuit would double the size of the courts of appeals. Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal
Courts, supra note 87, at 53. Chief Judge Sloviter of the Third Circuit supports a middle
course of measured growth. Sloviter, supra note 101, at 18. Chief Judge 'ljoflat of the
Eleventh Circuit views the creation ofnew appellate judgeships as one ofthe main problems
facing the federal courts. 'ljoflat, supra note 86. In September 1993, the Judicial Conference
of the United States, by a close vote, rejected a proposal to call on Congress to set a 1000judge limit on the federal judiciary. The Judicial Conference did reaffirm, however, the
judicial branch's commitment to the principle oflimited federal courts staffed by the number
of judges needed to perform their proper role. Henry J. Reske, Keeping a Trim Federal
Judiciary, ABA J., Dec. 1993, at 26; Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Capping Judges,
NAT'!. L.J., Oct. 4, 1993, at 7.
114 The arguments over a moratorium can be listed:
1. Continuing increases in the size of the federal judiciary will eventually create unacceptable problems:
a. Unchecked expansion of district and circuit judgeships vitiates the
historic understanding, based on federalism, that the federal judiciary is
a specialized body of limited jurisdiction.
b. Cohesiveness and efficiency will be impaired.
c. The quality of federal courts will decline because:
(1) As the number of judgeships increases, the ability of the office
to attract the most qualified individuals will decline.
(2) As the number ofvacancies to be filled increases, it will become
increasingly difficult for executive and legislative branches to nominate
and confirm with sufficient care.
d. A larger federal judiciary will require more resources than Congress
will be willing to appropriate.
2. Without an explicit moratorium, the federal judicial workload will
continue to grow, leading Congress to continue to add more judgeships
to the system.
3. A moratorium will allow the courts to avoid growing larger because
it will force Congress to control jurisdictional expansion and restrict
unnecessary access to the courts, and it will force the courts to develop
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the number of circuit judges and for good reason. For the last 200plus years, practical poUtical necessity has overcome abstract
concerns of limits with each enlargement of the federal appellate
bench. And past congressional conduct is the best predictor of
future policymaking. Chief Judge Sloviter has provided the best
summing up of this debate: "[T]he federal courts must expand, if
at all, under a set of reasoned principles rather than by ad hoc
congressional decisions.... Measured growth, together with
congressional and executive restraint, are the roads to a reasoned
solution."135 The most important result of the circuit judges'
recent public debate is that some attention has been focused on the
problems of the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
V. DIVIDING COURTS OF APPEALS

Congress once demonstrated a ready willingness to redraw circuit
boundaries and to reassign states to existing or newly created
circuits. 13G During th~ modem period, Congress twice has divided
existing circuits into two new circuits: in 1929 to separate the new
Tenth Circuit from the Eighth Circuit, and in 1981 to separate the
new Eleventh Circuit from the Fifth Circuit.
In 1925, efforts to alleviate the congestion in the circuit dockets
centered on the Eighth Circuit. 137 That court then covered
thirteen states from Minnesota in the north to New Mexico in the
more efficient procedures.
4. A cap on the number ofjudgeships can be successfully implemented.
a. A statutory change can be effective.
b. Only an unequivocal cap, identified and argued for as such, will
assist the federal courts.
c. Geographic shifts in demand for judicial services can be accommo-

dated.
BERMANT ET AL., supra note 86, at 24.
m Sloviter, supra note 101, at 18. Judge King of the Fifth Circuit once offered an
appropriate reality check: "[l]n the 1980s and forevermore thereafter, we have had and will
have a great number of judges. That reality is simply a fact of life and something that
judges themselves would do well to recognize. There is no point in clinging to the past if the
future arrived years ago." Carolyn D. King, A Matter ofConscience, 28 Hous. L. REV. 955,
959 (1991).
1M This discussion has been adapted, with permission, from: Baker, supra note 69, at
923-25.
1J7 See Arthur J. Stanley & Irma S. Russell, The Political and Administrative History of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 60 DENY. L.J. 119, 124-28 (1983).
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south and from Iowa in the east to Utah in the west. In 1927, an
ABA committee, without the formal endorsement of the ABA,
proposed to redraw all the existing circuit boundaries and in the
process create a new Tenth Circuit to include Arizona, California,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. l38 The
opposition to the proposal proved diverse and effective. Opponents
complained chiefly about switching states from one circuit to
another and the consequent changes in the law, although buttressing arguments were heard: that the workload in the Eighth Circuit
did not justify a division, that the bill would not adequately address
the docket problem because it failed to create new judgeships, and
that the one-to-one ratio of circuits to Justices on the Supreme
Court should not be abandoned. 139 After that, Chief Justice Taft,
exercising characteristic leadership, suggested that Congress could
divide the Eighth Circuit and leave alone all the others. 140
Members ofthe bar and the judges on the Eighth Circuit supported
this proposal and, after debating various bills to divide the court in
different ways, Congress passed a statute in 1929 dividing the
court and creating two new judgeships. 141
Since then, the Eighth Circuit has included Arkansas, IQwa,
Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota; and the Tenth Circuit
has included Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and
Wyoming. 142 Since 1929, active judgeships have increased in the
138 [d. at 124 (citing DENISE BONN, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., THE GEOGRAPHICAL DMSION
OF THE EIGHTH CmcUIT COURT OF APPEALS 4 (1974) (research report written for the Federal
Judieial Center».
139 [d. at 124-25.
140 To Create a Tenth Judicial Circuit: Hearings on H.R. 5690, H.R. 13567, and H.R.
13757 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1928) (testimony
of Chief Justice Taft).
141 Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch. 363, sec. 1, § 116, 45 Stat. 1346, 1346-47. See generally
THEODORE J. FETTER, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. BICENTENNIAL COMM., A HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CmCUIT 43-46 (1977) (discussing
the division of the Eighth Circuit).
142 Because the District of Wyoming includes all of that state and such portions of
Yellowstone National Park as are within Montana and Idaho, the Tenth Circuit contains
areas outside the six listed states. 28 U.S.C. § 131 (1988); WRIGHT, supra note 38, § 2, at
8 n.3. An even more obscure provision is the Ninth Circuit's statutory mandate to decide
issues arising out of the Snake River Watershed via the Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (1988). 9TH Cm. R. 15-2.1. This
moves the Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction into Wyoming, a Tenth Circuit state, as far as Jackson
Lake. See generally Arthur D. Hellman, Legal Problems ofDilliding a State Between Federal
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Eighth Circuit from five to eleven and in the Tenth Circuit from
four to twelve. 143 The dockets of the courts of appeals in 1929,
the year of the division, have so little in common with contemporary dockets in size or in scope, however, that a comparison is not
very helpful. These two courts of appeals today are typical in that
increased staff and procedural innovations have enabled them to
stay afloat. 144 What is noteworthy about even this brief of an
account is the legislative reluctance to redraw all the circuit
boundaries and the congressional strategy to focus, instead, on
dividing one large "problem" circuit. The same conclusion was
reached again and was explained further in 1973 by the so-called
"Hruska Commission":
We have not recommended a general realignment of
all the circuits. To be sure, the present boundaries
are largely the result of historical accident and do
not satisfy such criteria as parity of caseloads and
geographical compactness. But these boundaries
have stood since the nineteenth century, except for
the creation of the Tenth Circuit in 1929, and whatever the actual extent of variation in the law from
circuit to circuit, relocation would take from the
bench and bar at least some of the law now familiar
to them. Moreover, the Commission has heard
eloquent testimony evidencing the sense ofcommunity shared by lawyers and judges within the present
circuits. Except for the most compelling reasons, we
are reluctant to disturb institutions which have
acquired not only the respect but also the loyalty of
their constituents. 145
Judicial Circuits, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1188 (1974). At least theoretically, every state is
located within two different courts of appeals, since the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has a nationwide jurisdiction.
143 28 U.S.C.A. § 44(a) (West Supp. 1992). See generally Donald P. Lay, Observations of
Twenty-Five Years as a United States Circuit Judge, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 595 (1992)
(a reminiscence covering the recent history of the Eighth Circuit).
144 See Baker, A Compendium ofProposals, supra note 1, at 273-74.
146 Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, The Geographical
Boundaries of the Several Judicial Circuits: Recommendations for Change, 62 F.R.D. 223,
228 (1973).
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That comprehensive study recommended, instead of a national
reconfiguration, that Congress divide the two largest courts of
appeals-the Fifth Circuit, which has occurred, and the Ninth
Circuit, which remains under congressional consideration still
today.
The division of the Fifth Circuit and the debate over the Ninth
Circuit are closer in time and more relevant to the present
consideration. Congress divided the former Fifth Circuit in 1981
essentially because it was so large in geography, population, docket,
and judgeships. But both new courts of appeals, the new Fifth
Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit, continue to be plagued by dockets
that effectively exceed their judicial capacity.l46 The debate over
whether to divide the Ninth Circuit has focused on recent bills and
the relevant congressional debate. Considering the full scale
arguments pro- and con-division, the congressional impasse may be
considered a good thing. A moratorium on congressional consideration of circuit splitting, at least until the fate of the Ninth Circuit
can be decided within the larger context of determining the future
of the entire system of regional courts of appeals, makes considerable sense. 147 The Ninth Circuit experience with a large court of
appeals can be instructive in that larger determination. Discussions of what happened in the Fifth Circuit division and what
should happen with the Ninth Circuit will not be rehearsed here.
Rather, the inquiry here addresses the extramural reform ofcircuit
splitting more generally.
For a time, circuit splitting, dividing the largest courts of appeals
into two or three new courts, was a commonly mentioned solution. l48 The problems of the large court, for which splitting is
offered as a solution, are chiefly the result of the simple-minded
approach just discussed of adding judgeships to meet a rising
caseload. At some point, the argument here is that Congress must
come to realize that the addition of appellate judges decreases the

148

Thomas E. Baker, A Legislative History ofthe Creation ofthe Eleventh Circuit, 8 GA.

ST. U. L. REV. 363, 380-83 (1982).
Baker, supra note 69, at 945-61.
148 Quentin N. Burdick, Federal Courts ofAppeals: Radical Surgery or Conservative Care,
60 Ky. L.J. 807, 810-12 (1972) (discussing the policy behind splitting the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits); Wade H. McCree, Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 777,
784-85 (1981) (same).
147
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overall effectiveness of the judicial system.149
There is a predictable downside to splitting circuits. The more
courts ofappeals there are, the greater the likelihood ofintercircuit
conflicts. Furthermore, splitting irreversibly dilutes the "federalizing function of courts of appeals.,,150 The fewer states the circuit
includes, the less national the court becomes. Of course, everyone
agrees with the logic that at some point adding judges and dividing
courts becomes a limited strategy.151 Perhaps the most important
argument against splitting existing circuits is that the reform has
not worked to alleviate workload. Some large circuits that might
need splitting, like the District of Columbia, Second, and Ninth
Circuits, for various reasons are as a practical matter indivisible.152 The division of the former 'Fifth Circuit did not work any
lasting miracle. The new Fifth Circuit is back to its pre-division
statistical crisis level in terms of fIlingS. 153 The Eleventh Circuit's docket continues to grow. The Ninth Circuit, which so far
has escaped the axe, is doing well enough to continue to resist
division, at least for now.1M
Rather than splitting existing circuits, the entire geographical
scheme could be redrawn. Generally, such a strategy has its
inherent difficulties. Consider for a moment two examples. The
late Judge Rubin once argued that Congress should strive to
equalize size and workload by creating approximately twenty
circuits.155 Chief Judge Wallace would have Congress consolidate
1•• "Congress recognize[s] that a point is reached where the addition ofjudges decreases
the effectiveness ofthe court, complicates the administration ofuniform law, and potentially
diminishes the quality of justice within a circuit." Heflin, supra note 83, at 616 (citation
omitted).
laO John Minor Wisdom, Requiem for a Great Court, 26 LoY. L. REV. 787, 788 (1980); see
also Charles Alan Wright, The OverloodedFifth Circuit: A Crisis in JudicialAdministration,
42 TEx. L. REv. 949, 974 (1964).
161 "[A]re we to continue the splitting process until it becomes mincing, with a United
States Court ofAppeals for the Houston Metropolitan Area?" Thomas G. Gee, The Imminent
Destruction ofthe Fifth Circuit; Or, How Not to Deal with a Blossoming Docket, 9 TEx. TECH
L. REv. 799, 806 (1978).
152 Carrington, supra note 52, at 587 (discussing how some circuits are not amenable to
geographical division); Hellman, supra note 142 (same).
161 Gilbert Ganucheau, Speech at the Fifth Circuit Appellate Advocacy Seminar (Oct. 18,
1984), in 2 FIFTH CIRCUIT REP. 301 (1985).
1M Cheryl Frank, Split 9th Circuit? It's Doing Fine as Is, ChiefSays, AB.A J., Jan. 1985,
at 30.
156 Alvin B. Rubin, Views from the Lower Court, 23 UCLA L. REv. 448, 459 (1976).
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the courts of appeals and dramatically reduce their number. 156
Neither approach directly addresses the real problem. Redrawing
circuit boundaries, by itself, is not worth the effort. More circuits
would increase the likelihood of intercircuit conflicts. Fewer
circuits would increase the likelihood ofintracircuit conflicts. lithe
principal concern is for conflicting decisions and conflicts in the
federal law, the downside of having fewer circuits may be preferable in the abstract over the downside of multiplying the number of
circuits. The existing mechanisms of the law of the circuit and the
en banc court might prove sufficient to cope with numerous
intracircuit conflicts, and new mechanisms also might be devised
within the circuits to remedy the problem of more intracircuit
conflicts. On the other hand, only the Supreme Court can effectively deal with the problem of intercircuit conflicts given the present
federal court organization. Intracircuit conflicts are a lesser evil
than intercircuit conflicts. If the principal concern is for workload,
however, neither approach has much to offer on the upside.
Redrawing circuit boundaries has the same effect on appellate
workload as a weather forecaster's map markings have on the
weather. Circuit splitting must therefore be dismissed as something of a red herring, the result of Congress's linear strategy of
adding judges. It is a solution that has not solved the problem.
Short of a fmal and full division, a circuit can be reorganized into
administrative units and achieve some of the benefits of division.
Then-ChiefJudge Lay, picking up on the abbreviated experience of
the former Fifth Circuit and the longer, more elaborate experience
of the Ninth Circuit with administrative units, has suggested that
Congress should authorize circuits to subdivide, as it were. 157
Former Chief Judge Lay's idea is that the present appellate
structure must be reconfigured to increase its capacity to absorb
the additional circuitjudgeships he deems necessary and inevitable.
Beginning with the Ninth Circuit model,158 he would take it further:

158 J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent ofIntercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed
for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CAL. L. REv. 913, 940-41 (1983).
157 Donald P. Lay, The Federal Appeals Process: Whither We Goest? The Next Fifty Years,
15 WM. MITcHELL L. REv. SIS, 529 (1989).
158 See generally REsTRUCTURING JUSTICE-THE INNOVATION OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND
THE FuTuRE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990) (collection of articles
concerning structure and internal procedures ofjudicial administration).
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Taking my own [Eighth] [C]ircuit for example, and
supposing that we had twenty judges on the court
rather than the present ten, the court could be
structured in such a way as to divide the responsibility for the northern states and southern states by
having nine judges in a southern district, nine judges
in a northern district, and two judges who would sit
at large. The judges could either rotate after serving
three to five year terms or stay within their assigned
district. Thus, despite the increase in the number of
judges, the circuit would preserve its stability because there generally would be three panels of the
same judges serving the northern section and three
panels of the same judges serving the southern
section. 11l9
Because Congress has authorized any court of appeals with more
than fifteen active judges to constitute itself into administrative
units,l60 further legislative authorization would be required to
allow the smaller courts of appeals to experiment with this
idea. l6l
VI.

SPECIALIZED APPELLATE COURTS

The subject of specialized courts is sometimes divisive and often
boring. Little remains to be said in a general way. However, one
prominent champion deserves an honorable mention here. This
discussion will offer relevant background.
Specialized appellate courts have been a part of the federal
system for a long time and their number has recently increased.
Since 1950 the United States Court of Military Appeals has had

Lay, supra note 157, at 529.
Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633,
supplemented bj' Act of Oct. 15, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1981).
111 The Federal Courta Study Committee apparently intended to recommend only the
general authorization of the limited en banc and not the administrative units. STUDY
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 114-15.
161
110
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appellate jurisdiction over the military justice system. 162 The
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals was vested with subject
matter jurisdiction over price-wage regulations and then was
assigned jurisdiction to review regulations in the energy field. 163
In 1981 Congress established the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit and reassigned the nationwide appellate
jurisdiction ofthe eliminated Court of Claims and Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals. l64 There are not more such courts because
the creation of specialized courts has been consistently disfavored. l65 Further specialized courts have been suggested-often
depending on the proponent's like or dislike for the subject area-in
tax law/66 administrative law,167 and criminal law.168
Court specialization holds out the promise ofdeepening expertise,
162 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1988). See generally John T. Willis, The United States Court of
Military Appeals-f<BomAgain," 5200. L.J. 151 (1976) (discussing role of Court ofMilitary

Appeals).
163

See generally 17 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRocEDURE §

4105 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1992) (discussing Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals). A
similar tribunal handled price control cases during World War II. See Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (upholding review of price regulations review by Emergency
Court of Appeals); see also James R. Elkins, The Temporary Emergency Court ofAppeals:
A Study in the Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 1978 DUKE L.J. 113 (examining
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals); STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 73
(recommending abolishment).
184 Act ofApr. 2,1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. See generally Harold C. Petrowitz,
Federal Court Reform: The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982---And Beyond, 32 AM.
U. L. REv. 543 (1983) (discussing resolved and unresolved problems of federal court system);
Symposium, Celebrating the Tenth Anniversary of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 14 GEO. MAsoN U. L. REv. 499-601 (1992).
186 E.g., CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 87, at 167-84; HOWARD, supra note 102, at 284-86;
RoBERT ALLEN LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS 41-42, 7071 (1976); Higginbotham, supra note 83, at 268; Lumbard, supra note 53, at 34-35.
166 Erwin N. Griswold, Cutting the Cloak to Fit the Cloth: An Approach to Problems in
the Federal Courts, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 787, 806-07 (1983); Erwin N. Griswold, The Need for
a Court ofTax Appeals, 57 HARv. L. REV. 1153 (1944).
167 Bork, supra note 112, at 237-38; Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative
Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REv. 329 (1991); Robert M. Cooper, The Proposed United States
Administrative Court (pts. 1 & 2), 35 MICH. L. REV. 193 (1936), 35 MICH. L. REV. 565 (1937).
The District of Columbia Circuit has come close to being a de facto specialized court for
federal administrative agency review. See generally GoRDON BERMANT ET AL., FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CTR., THE CASES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUIT (1982) (analyzing the burden ofadministrative agency appellate cases on
the District of Columbia Circuit).
166 ClementF. Haynsworth, Jr., Improving the Handling ofCriminal Cases in the Federal
Appellate System, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 604-07 (1974).
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uniformity, and stability, as judges become more experienced and
encounter the full dimension of their subject matter. Proposals for
specialized courts have been resisted for several reasons: (1)
specialized judges develop too narrow a perspective; (2) a stratified
bar would develop with specialist attorneys having peculiar
relationships with their bench; (3) balkanized procedural rules
would develop and substantive principles would evolve in a
sheltered environment; (4) a narrower subject matter jurisdiction
would open the possibility that special interests would have undue
influence on the area of the law; and (5) limiting jurisdiction would
limit prestige and attract less able judges. 169 At bottom, specialization simply threatens the generalist assumptions ofthe common
law order.
One commentator summed up the worries for specialized courts:
[A] body of law, secluded from the rest, develops a
jargon of its own, thought-patterns that are unique,
internal policies which it subserves and which are
different from and sometimes at odds with the
policies pursued by the general law....
Once you complete the circle of specialization by
having a specialized court as well as a specialized
Bar, then you have set aside a body of wisdom that
is the exclusive possession of a very small group of
men who take their purposes for granted. Very soon
their internal language becomes so highly stylized as
to be unintelligible to the uninitiated. That in turn
intensifies the seclusiveness ofthat branch ofthe law
and that further immunizes it against the refreshment of new ideas, suggestions, adjustments and
compromises which constitute the very tissue of any
living system oflaw. In time, like a primitive priestcraft, content with its vested privileges, it ceases to
proselytize, to win converts to its cause, to persuade

188 Ben F. Overton, A Prescription for the Appellate Caseload Explosion, 12 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 205, 221-22 (1984); see also Edward V. DiLello, Note, Fighting Fire with Firefighters:
A Proposal for Expert Judges at the Trial Level, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 473 (1993) (trial court
proposal).
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laymen of the social values that it defends. Such a
development is invariably a cause of decadence and
decay.170
Not all commentators are skeptical about specialized courts. For
example, Professor Meador, a long-time participant and scholar of
federal court reform, has been a dedicated and prominent champion
of further experiments with subject matter courts. l7l
The idea of specialized subject matter courts got typically mixed
reviews from the Federal Courts Study Committee. The Committee's Final Report recommended that Congress "rationalize the
structure of federal tax adjudication by (1) creating an Article III
appellate division of the United States Tax Court with exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals in federal income, estate, and gift tax
cases and (2) restricting initial tax litigation to the trial division of
the Tax Court (staffed by the current Article I judges)."172 However, the Committee rejected the idea of an administrative law
court.173 What finally can be said about the possibilities for
specialized federal appellate courts? Proposals will have to
overcome resistance, and experimentation on a limited scale may
lead to more large-scale implementation. But the predictable
attitude will be one of caution.

170 Simon Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized
Judiciary, 37 A.BA J. 425, 425-26 (1951). See also Claudia MacLachlan, The Tax Bench:
A Code Apart, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 27, 1993, at l.
171 See, e.g., Daniel J. Meador, Appellate Case Management and Decisional Processes, 61
VA. L. REv. 255, 282-85 (1975) (discussing problem of judicial harmony with multiple
decisional unit court system); Daniel J. Meador, An Appellate Court Dilemma and a Solution
Through Subject Matter Organization, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 471 (1983); Daniel J. Meador,
Appellate Subject Matter Organization: The German Design from an American Perspective,
5 HAsTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 27 (1981) (discussing German division ofcourts by subject
matter); Meador, supra note 66, at 645-47 (proposing subject matter organization in federal
courts); Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional
Design of the u.s. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 603 (1989) (discussing idea of
reducing judicial burdens by reorganizing federal court system by routing more categories
of appeals to non-regional appellate courts).
172 STUDY COMMl'ITEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 69.
173 Id. at 72-73.
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VII. IMPROVING FEDERAL LEGISLATION

The last mentioned extramural proposal is for Congress in its
own domain as lawmaker. Judge Edwards has complained that the
courts of appeals are choking on "ambiguous and internally
inconsistent statutes."174 Incoherence, vagueness, and conflicting
purposes in statutes all waste judicial resources and cause
decisional division. More careful drafting and a clear statement of
legislative purpose are required. Vague legislation is not the sole
product of ineptness; characteristically, the legislative process is
full of compromise and agreements reached through escapes to
higher levels of abstraction. Congress is unlikely to change its
habits even though the vagaries ofthe legislative process frequently
are frustratingly felt by the courts. Congress can be expected to do
more, however, to remedy outmoded judicial statutes, answer
unanticipated questions, and reconcile conflicting statutory schemes
in the first place. Legislative responsiveness is preferable to
legislative inaction or judicial legislating.175
Then-Judge Ginsburg once proposed that Congress itself"do more
and do better" by way of monitoring the federal courts' efforts at
statutory interpretation in the second place. 176 She complains
that Congress "expresses itself too often in commands that are
unclear, imprecise, or gap-ridden" and that poor statutory drafting
is not only a problem for the fIrst court that addresses the statute,
but also for subsequent courts that are obliged to make the
statutory scheme workable. Rejecting the third branch solution as
the approach of the past, she argues for Congress to follow through
on legislation to monitor court interpretations, to approve or disapprove judicial gloss, and to correct ambiguities and omissions in an
orderly and routinized effort at legislative oversight. 177 One
possible mechanism for accomplishing this task would be to
establish a standing "second look" committee in each house or a

174 Harry T. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections on
Current Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385, 424-25 (198384) (citations omitted).
176Id. at 427-29.
174 Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARv. L.

REv. 1417 (1987).
177 Id. at 1429-34.
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joint committee "commissioned to oversee the tasks of statutory
reexamination and repair."17S There is no question that "[al
legislative second view, set in motion by court decisions on unclear
or incomplete congressional prescriptions, could advance the
coherence of federallaw."179
The District of Columbia Circuit, on which Judges Edwards and
Ginsburg served together, developed a pilot project for inter-branch
communication aimed at improving federal legislation. The
program began in 1992 between the D.C. Circuit and the House of
Representatives, but soon the Senate agreed to participate and it
is anticipated that the First, Third, Seventh and Tenth Circuits will
soon join.ISO Basically, the staff attorney at the court of appeals
reviews slip opinions and culls those that address federal statutes
with problems of poor drafting, ambiguous wording, or technical
mistakes.lSI The court of appeals then reviews these and selects

[d. at 1432.
[d. at 1435. Somewhat related to this proposal is the value of due process of
lawmaking, which essentially is the expectation that Congress save its best effort for
important legislation. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 548-54 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). See generally Hans A. Linde, Due Process ofLawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197
(1976) (discussing due process formula and relation to creation oflaws); Terrance Sandalow,
Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162 (1977) (analyzing problem of
balancing judicial protection of minorities with respect for values expressed in legislation);
Laurence Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975) (proposing
addition of structural due process analysis along with substantive and procedural due
process).
180 The project originated with the Governance Institute, a privately funded Washingtonbased think tank. Presumably, the D.C. Circuit and the House of Representatives were the
first to be linked partly as a coincidence of the elevation of Chief Judge Mikva, who served
in the House. Cris Carmody, Branches Try To Communicate, NAT'L L.J., July 19, 1993, at
3; see also 138 CONGo REc. S17537 (Oct. 8, 1992).
181 The local procedures in the D.C. Circuit provide as follows:
178

1711

PILOT PROJECT - D.C. CmCUIT
As a statutory "housekeeping effort," some opinions of U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit will be forwarded without
comment to the House of Representatives for its information.
1. Decisions will identify technical, noncontroversial problems which might be
of congressional interest. Specifically, the following categories of cases apply:
(a) Grammatical/Drafting Mistakes. Statutes containing errors in
grammar, syntax, punctuation or spelling.
(b) Ambiguities. Statutory provisions that are susceptible to more
than one meaning and where the legislative history provides no direction
or no clear direction as to the intended meaning.
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the appropriate ones for transmittal to the offices of legislative
counsel in the House and Senate, where the opinions are reviewed
and routed to congressional leaders and drafting committees. This
vents the interpretation frustrations of the judges and places
Congress on notice ofthe problems with existing legislation. So far,
the D.C. Circuit has sent over several opinions, but Congress has
not yet taken any formal legislative action. 182 This pilot program
has obvious potential for constructive communication within the
context ofthe separated powers oflawmaking and law interpreting.
If it bears fruit, there is no reason that it should not be extended
to all the courts of appeals. The ball is now in Congress's court, so
to speak.
Such obligations are generally within the legitimate expectations
of Congress. Appellate federal jurisdiction is a scarce resource that
must be used wisely. For example, Congress ought to rank the
competing demands on appellate resources, overall recognizing that
the docket demand outstrips decisional supply and that deficits in
jurisdiction debase the appellate remedy. Congress should attempt
to articulate a hierarchy of appeals. Thus far it has only identified
a large number of preferred categories of appeals without any

(c) Gaps. Cases where the court is required to fill a gap in an
effective date or other similar gap.
2. The opinions selected for referral will not include those which are
decided on the basis of substantive policy questions.
3. Decisions will not be referred if another federal statute provides a
solution to the interpretation problem. For example, generic provisions
in title 28 may resolve questions regarding venue, jurisdiction, or the
proper statute of limitations. Similarly, the Administrative Procedure
Act (5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.) and its judicial review provisions (5 U.S.C. §
701-706) may also provide a solution.
4. Decisions will not be referred where the application ofthe traditional rules of statutory construction resolve the ambiguity.
5. Statutory silence on policy choices (such as the awarding of
attorneys' fees) will not in itself be considered a gap or ambiguity (i.e.,
not a subject for referral).
(on me with author).
182 See, e.g., Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. National Mediation Bd., 996 F.2d 1271
(D.C. Cir. 1993); Public Citizen, Inc. v. FAA, 988 F.2d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v.
Home, 987 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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internal consistency.l83 First, this uniquely political process must
rationalize supply and demand and assign supply priorities. From
then on, Congress must not practice deficit jurisdiction. For the list
of priorities to be long-lasting, Congress must monitor and
maintain the equilibrium as an on-going duty. Just as important,
Congress should consider jurisdictional impact statements and
expressly reorder the hierarchy with the enactment of each new
statute that has an impact on the federal appellate docket. This
idea is not new. Chief Justice Burger first urged such impact
statements in 1970.184 Such an approach is needed today more
than ever.185
The Federal Courts Study Committee recommended a modest
first level phase for this sort of approach. The Committee urged
the creation of a "checklist" for legislative staff to apply to proposed
legislation dealing with technical problems such as the appropriate
statute of limitations, whether a private cause of action is contemplated, whether preemption of state laws is intended, how to define
key statutory terms, et cetera. 18G The Study Committee went on
to endorse something functionally akin to Judge Ginsburg's concept,
but proposed to locate the oversight function in the judicial branch.
It recommended that an "Office of Judicial Impact Assessment" be
created in the federal judiciary "to advise Congress on, inter alia,
the effect of proposed legislation on the judicial branch and
legislative drafting matters likely to lead to unnecessary litigation."187 The Study Committee's proposed office would evaluate
proposed legislation for two purposes: "forecasting additional
judicial branch resources necessary to dispose of the litigation the
bill would create; and spotlighting drafting defects that might breed

183 See generally Committee on Federal Legislation, The Impact of Civil Expediting
Provisions on the United States Courts of Appeals, 37 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 19 (1982) (a

discussion of appellate priority and proposals for reform).
184 Warren E. Burger, The State ofthe Federal Judiciary-1972, 58 A.B.A. J. 1049, 1050
(1972).
185 See Bernard S. Meyer, Justice, Bureaucracy, Structure, and Simplification, 42 MD. L.
REV. 659, 671-72 (1983) (discussing utility of impact statements); Rubin, supra note 10, at
658.
186 STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 91-92. As ofthis writing, a bill has been
introduced to establish such a legislative checklist. S. 1569, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
187 STUDY COMMlTl'EE REPORT, supra note 22, at 89.
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unnecessary litigation."IBS The Study Committee also suggested,
"Congress may also find it helpful to develop its own resource for
committees and staff' for these purposes.189
Judges, legislators, and commentators can be hopeful that some
of these suggestions for Congress to "do more and do better"
legislatively will be embraced in the same spirit with which the
circuit judges have responded over time to the same challenge
relating to their caseload.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

There is nothing inherently inadequate about the extramural
reforms of the past. The reforms identified in this Article have
worked in the past and would be adequate to stave off the future
threat of appellate caseload if pursued in earnest. However, the
reforms of the past seem to have lost some of their luster, either
out of familiarity or as a result of half-hearted implementation in
recent years.
Consider some expectations about the congressional realities,
based on the psychological insight that past behavior is the best
predictor of future behavior. Congress will not reduce the original
jurisdiction of the district courts. Political considerations do not
permit this. ADR represents some of the same case management
shortcuts for the trial court that the courts of appeals have relied
on for years and will create a new set of problems. Creating circuit
judgeships has become a reluctant response to appellate caseload,
and rightly so, considering the negative by-products of adding
judges to the existing federal court structure. Congress lately has
shown signs of abandoning the technique of dividing circuits, at

[d. at 90.
[d. Some members of the Study Committee expressed additional views to urge
Congress to go further to create a new entity in the legislative branch:
(1) to assist congressional committees to assess the impact on the federal
judiciary (and perhaps the federal prisons) of proposed litigation; (2) to
call to the attention of the Congress decisions by the courts and the
executive branch that have important consequences on the courts or the
Congress; and (3) to facilitate communications between the branches by
providing a contact point for judges and other officials.
[d. at 92-93. The Administrative Office of U.S. Courts responded to this recommendation
by reorganizing its legislative office and creating an Office for Long Range Planning.
188
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least temporarily. Again, this is a wise recognition of the distributive property of appellate caseloads. At the same time, there are
some signs that creating specialized appellate courts may be
coming into legislative fashion. The plea for Congress to "do more
and do better" seems to have some as yet unrealized potential to
preserve scarce judicial resources, but Congress will have to reform.
Individually, and collectively, these old stand-by extramural
reforms continue to offer some hope for relief, but the hope cannot
be described as enthusiastic. Recently, the Federal Courts Study
Committee, a blue-ribbon panel of federal court insiders, urged
Congress and the nation to take the debate over extramural or
structural reforms to the next level. This is the next task for
federal courts scholars, to imagine the alternative futures of the
U.S. Courts of Appeals. l90

See generally Thomas E. Baker, Imagining the Alternative Futures ofthe U.S. Courts
ofAppeals, 28 GA. L. REV. 913 (1994).
190
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